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INTRODUCTION
The reputation of cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) among American
academics has never been as poor as it is today, while its popularity
among agencies in the United States government has never been
greater. Many law professors, economists, and philosophers who have
written about CBA, believe that it does not produce morally relevant
information and should not be used in project evaluation. A few
commentators argue that while the information produced by CBA may
have some relevance, the procedure itself is deeply flawed. Defenders of
CBA form an increasingly beleaguered minority, consisting mostly of
applied economists who feel compelled to respond to attacks on the
methodological underpinnings of their work. Modern textbooks on
CBA are plentiful, and many of them are optimistic about the
usefulness of the procedure, but most of them frankly acknowledge its
serious flaws and the inadequacy of the standard methods for correcting
these flaws.
Government agencies now routinely use CBA. This was not
always the case. Before the 1980s, agencies seldom relied on CBA
when evaluating regulations and other projects. But executive orders
issued by the Reagan and Clinton administrations have since made the
use of CBA by agencies common,3 and Congress has enacted
numerous statutes requiring agencies to perform cost-benefit analyses.4
EPA alone has spent tens of millions of dollars on CBA over the last
                                                
1 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
2 Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks to Steve Coate, Alon Harel,
Saul Levmore, Cass Sunstein, David Weisbach, and participants in workshops
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the University of Chicago Law
School, for helpful comments.
3 EXEC. ORDER NO. 12291, 3 CFR 128 (1981); EXEC. ORDER NO. 12866, 3
CFR 638 (1993). Clinton’s order qualified Reagan’s order a bit but essentially
endorsed the use of CBA. See Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1995).
4 See Edward R. Morrison, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1333-34 (1998) (and citations
therein).
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fifteen years.5 Other agencies are as committed as EPA to using and
improving the techniques of CBA. The academics’ skepticism appears
to have had no influence on them. What accounts for this divergence
between academic opinion and government practice? Are the academic
criticisms of CBA valid?
This Article provides a qualified defense of the use of CBA by
administrative agencies. It makes the following claims. First, a
common criticism of CBA—that it sometimes produces morally
unjustified outcomes—overlooks the fact that CBA is a decision
procedure, not a moral standard. A decision procedures is a
methodology for achieving desirable results, and some decision
procedures are more accurate than others. CBA is justified, even if it
sometimes produces undesirable outcomes, as long as it produces
desirable outcomes more frequently than alternative decision procedures
do. We argue that standard alternatives that are proposed in the
literature—risk-risk analysis, feasibility-based assessment, direct
interpersonal comparisons, and so on—are less accurate than CBA, as
long as CBA is used in the right way.
Second, CBA will produce reasonably accurate results only as long
as it is used in the right way, and this means that under certain
conditions agencies should depart from the traditional understanding
of CBA. When a proposed project would affect people who have
highly unequal levels of wealth, or who are poorly informed about the
consequences of the project, or whose preferences for other reasons fail
to register projects that would enhance their well-being, agencies
should modify or depart from CBA. The proper modifications will in
some cases require the weighting of people’s valuations of a benefit of
a project; in other cases, the agencies may have to engage in direct
comparison of the effect of a project on people’s well-being, however
hazardous such a judgment might be. The proper adjustments to
standard CBA cannot be described at a high level of abstraction, but
depend on such things as the competence of agencies, the degree to
which they can be monitored by politically responsive actors, and the
extent to which people’s stated preferences are well-informed and
undistorted.
Third, CBA suitably revised to reflect these concerns is consistent
                                                
5 ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACt (Richard
D. Morgenstern ed. 1991)
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with a broad array of popular theories of the proper role of government.
It is commonly and mistakenly believed that CBA presupposes a strict
form of utilitarianism that assumes that the government should
maximize the satisfaction of people’s preferences, even when these
preferences are uninformed, distorted, or morally repugnant. By
contrast, we argue that CBA, properly understood, is consistent with
every political theory that holds that the government should care about
the overall well-being of its citizens—and every major political theory,
including highly egalitarian theories but excluding extreme
libertarianism, holds this view. The use of CBA by agencies in suitable
circumstances is consistent with commitments to distributive justice,
deontological rights, and other moral values. We also argue that the
traditional economic defenses of CBA—based on the Pareto principle
and the Kaldor-Hicks principle—are wrong.
We develop this argument in three parts. Part I provides some
background on CBA, including a brief history of the procedure and
some case studies that show how CBA is typically used by agencies
today. Part II describes the mechanics of CBA and explains why the
traditional economic defenses of CBA fail. Part III defends CBA on
the ground that it is the most suitable decision-procedure for agencies
to use in order to maximize the overall well-being of citizens.
I. BACKGROUND
Modern CBA is the outgrowth of three historical developments.
The first is the growth of the central government in the United States
and other countries over the course of the twentieth century. In the
United States the New Deal government initiated the use of CBA in
1936, when Congress ordered agencies to weigh costs and benefits
when evaluating projects designed for flood control.6 The popularity
of CBA among administrative agencies increased rapidly thereafter
with the growth of the federal government.7 The second development
was the rise of Progressivism at the end of the nineteenth century and
                                                
6 See Ajit K. Dasgupta and D.W. Pearce, CBA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 12-13
(1972) (United States Flood Control Act of 1936, which held that projects should
be approved if “the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue, are in excess of the
estimated costs.”).
7 For a brief history, see Theodore M. Porter, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE
PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 148-89 (1995).
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the beginning of the twentieth century. Progressives believed that
government can be separated into a realm of value-laden politics, and
a realm of administrative expertise which could be based on scientific
principles.8 The third development was the invention of modern
welfare economics, which would supply these scientific principles.
Early welfare economists believed that economic concepts could be
used to rationalize the implementation of government policies.9 Their
efforts were encouraged in the 1950s and 1960s when the U.S.
government, and the governments of other countries, sought technical
assistance in the development of formal procedures of CBA.10
Modern welfare economics can be traced back to Pareto. Pareto
proposed as a principle of evaluation that a project is desirable if it
makes at least one person better off without making anyone else worse
off.11 The self-evident moral correctness of the Pareto principle has
frequently been assumed by economists and others, although as we
discuss below it has serious flaws on ethical grounds. But the immediate
difficulty posed by the Pareto criterion was that it was too strong. Few
projects satisfy the criterion, because just about every worthwhile
government project will hurt people, and compensating those people
is usually infeasible. This difficulty led to the proposal of hypothetical
compensation tests by Kaldor, Hicks, and others.12 Compensation tests
                                                
8 See Richard H. Nelson, The Economics Profession and the Making of Public Policy,
25 J. ECON. LIT. 49, 52-54 (1987).
9 Id.
10 See Dasgupta and Pearce, supra note __, at 13. In addition, private companies
had independently developed techniques for evaluating their investment decisions,
and these techniques could be transferred to the public sector. Id.
11 See I.M.D. Little, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 84 (2d ed. 1957).
One could alternatively date modern welfare economics—or at least the Anglo-
American version—to Robbins’ attacks in the 1930s on the older “material welfare
school,” which focused on the material well-being of individuals (as opposed to
their utility, in the modern sense), and held that the material well-being of
individuals is comparable. See Robert Cooter and Peter Rappoport, Were the
Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LIT. 507, 520 (1984).
12 A useful discussion can be found in Little, supra note __, at 88-96. See
Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49
ECON. J. 549 (1939); John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49
ECON. J. 696 (1939); Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to
Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242
(1938).
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hold that a project is desirable if its beneficiaries are enriched enough
that they could overcompensate those who are hurt by the project. The
accomplishment of these tests was to enable the decision-maker to
quantify the positive and negative effects of a project and compare these
quantities along a single metric. This immensely simplifies the process
of evaluating projects, compared to the more-or-less intuitive methods
that were presumably used earlier. Moreover, the compensation tests
vastly increase the range of projects that can be evaluated, compared to
the Pareto test. The compensation tests would be the basis of modern
CBA.
The compensation tests, however, were received unenthusiastically
by theoretical welfare economists. When the storm of criticism
subsided, some economists declared that not only compensation tests,
but all of welfare economics, were dead,13 a declaration that has been
repeated many times since then.14 Despite these views, CBA obtained
a foothold among applied economists and government agencies.
Applied economists and agency officials believed that, whatever its
problems, CBA was superior to the alternatives. When the government
proposed a project, taxpayers and critics demanded a justification, and
the most obvious justification was that the project would produce gains
that exceeded its costs.15
Thus, CBA enjoyed a brief period of popularity in the 1960s,
despite the absence of a consensus on its theoretical foundation. By the
1970s, however, even applied economists and government agencies had
begun to doubt its utility. The emerging problems with CBA were not
theoretical, but practical and ideological. As a practical matter,
researchers had a great deal of trouble obtaining relevant data, especially
for the purpose of valuing environmental resources, human life, and
other hard-to-measure goods. The claim that the benefits of a project
exceed its costs is not persuasive when the benefits and the costs appear
to rely on arbitrary valuations. As an ideological matter, the technical
and utilitarian flavor of CBA was unappealing to the political culture
                                                
13 See J. de V. Graaff, THEORETICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS (1957) __.
14 See, e.g., John S. Chipman and James C. Moore, The New Welfare Economics
1939-1974, 19 INTERN’L ECON. REV. 547, 548 (1978) (calling modern welfare
economics a “failure”).
15 See Dasgupta and Pearce, supra note __, at 13.
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that reigned during the 1970s.16 It may be that progress in valuation
techniques, and changes in ideology, account for the reemergence of
CBA in the 1980s and 1990s—it is too early to tell. The simple truth
may be that CBA generally interferes with government regulation, if
only by slowing it down, so people oppose CBA when they seek greater
regulation (the 1970s) and they favor CBA when they seek less
regulation (the 1980s). Whatever the case, the modern rebirth of CBA
has not been accompanied by a theoretical defense. The original
theoretical objections to CBA have still not been rebutted.17
Understanding the problems and advantages of modern CBA,
however, is difficult. There are two reasons for this difficulty. First, the
academic literature on CBA is deeply fragmented, with critics from
different disciplines rarely paying attention to each other’s arguments.
Philosophers object to CBA because they think that it depends on an
implausible moral or political theory, like utilitarianism. Economists
who object to CBA usually do so on the grounds that it does not allow
a complete and consistent ordering of projects, or because it depends on
contestable normative premises that cannot be the basis of neutral and
scientific advice. Neither group pays much attention to institutional
issues, such as the role of agencies in a representative government, yet
law professors, who are well positioned to explore these issues, do not
say much about them, either. Law professors’ discussions of CBA,
moreover, frequently overlook the contributions made by economists
                                                
16 See D.W. Pearce and C.A. Nash, THE SOCIAL APPRAISAL OF PROJECTS: A
TEXT ON COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 3-4 (1981); R. Shep Melnick, The Politics
of Benefit-Cost Analysis, in VALUING HEALTH RISKS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING 23 (P. Brett Hammond and Rob
Coppock, eds. 1990) (attributing hostility to CBA to populism and politics).
17 A large legal literature addresses the related question whether legal rules in
general, and the common law in particular, do or should reflect efficiency
concerns. See, e.g., Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 485 (1980). This literature is of limited usefulness for our purposes. It does
not, for the most part, address CBA, and much of it is concerned about the role
of common-law judges. Otherwise, it resembles earlier discussions in the
economics literature. More recent treatments in the legal literature include Lewis
A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed. 1998); Mark Kelman, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114-50 (1987); Richard S. Markovits,
Duncan’s Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements,
36 STAN. L. REV. 1169 (1984).
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and philosophers.
Second, understanding CBA as described by textbooks is not the
same thing as understanding CBA as practiced by government
agencies. The economic, philosophical, and legal criticisms are for the
most part directed at the textbook version. But for all their enthusiasm
for CBA, it is not clear whether agencies use it properly. As we discuss
below, agencies sometimes appear to use CBA to rationalize decisions
made on other grounds. At other times, agencies may be sincere but
they depart from CBA without explaining their departure. For
example, they calculate costs or benefits by using national averages
when the project would affect a non-representative subset of the
population. Or they calculate some of the costs and some of the
benefits of the project, while ignoring others. Or they take into
account distributional considerations that are external to ordinary CBA
and inconsistent with the more ambitious textbook versions of CBA
that incorporate distributional weightings. The literature ignores these
complications, and instead debates CBA as an abstraction, not as a real
practice.
What is the real practice of CBA? It is hard to generalize, but a
few examples may help put the problems in context.
Lead in Drinking Water.18 Federal law requires EPA to regulate
lead contamination of drinking water. In 1991, EPA decided to revise
earlier regulations it had issued under the law, using a CBA of several
proposed rules.19 On the cost side, EPA estimated on an annualized
basis, using a 3% discount rate: the cost of treating contaminated water
that enters the distribution system, the cost of “corrosion control,” that
is, the cost of maintaining appropriate parameters of water quality (pH
level, temperature, etc.), the cost of replacing lead pipes, the cost of
warning the public of high lead levels and informing it of precautions,
and the cost of monitoring water quality. For each rule, EPA
calculated total costs by aggregating the cost of implementing the rule
in each of the water distribution systems in the United States, which,
of course, varied in the severity of lead contamination. The benefits of
                                                
18 Ronnie Levin, Lead in Drinking Water, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA,
supra note__, at 205.
19 For a discussion of the earlier rules, see Thomas O. McGarity, REINVENTING
RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACY 29-44 (1991).
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the three rules were divided into health benefits for children, pregnant
women and fetuses, and adult men. Only some of the benefits were
monetized, however. EPA estimated that the cost of medical
treatment for children with elevated lead levels would be between about
$300 and $3200 per child; the cost of compensatory education for
children with “cognitive damage” would be about $5800; and the cost
of lost future earnings would be $4600 per lost IQ point. For adults,
EPA estimated a willingness-to-pay of $1 million to avoid nonfatal
heart attacks and strokes, $628 per case for medical costs and lost
productivity because of hypertension, and $2.5 million per death. Total
costs were estimated by multiplying these amounts by the estimated
number of cases avoided, and summing the products. Although EPA
estimated the cost of the damage of contaminated water to plumbing
components, it did not include this estimate in the CBA published
with the final rule.
EPA concluded that the total health benefits from corrosion
control alone would be $63.8 billion over a twenty-year period, which
vastly exceeded estimated costs of $4.2 billion. The author of the study
(who also worked on the rule) argues that the CBA played an
important role in persuading EPA of the hazards posed by lead
contamination in drinking water. He also argues that CBA was
influential because data were plentiful and the analysis occurred early in
the regulatory process.20
Agricultural Pesticides.21 Federal law authorizes EPA to regulate
the labeling and use of pesticides. In 1983 EPA decided to revise earlier
regulations, and to evaluate new rules using CBA. On the cost side,
EPA determined the costs of workers waiting before entering treated
areas, personal protective equipment, notification procedures, training
workers in the use of pesticides, decontamination of workers affected
by pesticides, emergency assistance and medical care, rule
familiarization, and monitoring of the health of selected workers.
Because the necessary actions would vary from site to site, different cost
estimates were calculated for different kinds of sites, and results were
summed. Although the analysis was highly detailed, the final estimate
was necessarily rough, because EPA had little information about the
                                                
20 Id., pp. 228-29.
21 Louis P. True, Jr., Agricultural Pesticides and Worker Protection, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note __, at 303.
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size of the populations affected by the regulation. EPA did not attempt
to attach a monetary value to the benefits of the regulation, stating
instead that the regulation it finally chose would reduce the health
effects of pesticide use by 80%. These health effects were divided into
hospitalized poisonings (300-450 per year), physician-diagnosed but
nonhospitalized poisonings (10,000-20,000 per year), undiagnosed
poisonings (“a significant number ... very likely to be large” but
unquantified), cancer cases (6 or more per year), serious developmental
defects (20-52 per year), stillbirths (56-222 per year), persistent
neurotoxicity cases (150-300 per year), and others (unquantified).
Despite the failure to quantify benefits, EPA concluded that the
benefits of the regulation exceeded the costs.
During the rule making USDA argued that in order for the
regulation to be cost-justified, it would have to reduce the number of
hospitalizations by 239,000, assuming a cost of $580 each C
presumably, an excessive estimate, given that hospitalized poisonings
amounted to 300-450 per year. EPA responded that it considered other
benefits as well, but it did not quantify them because of deficiencies in
the data. One justification for the rule offered by EPA appears to have
been that the regulation was not so costly as to cause significant
economic disruptions to agriculture, but EPA did not explain what this
meant.22 Finally, EPA, according to the author of the study, appeared
to take account of distributional considerations without saying so
explicitly.23 The rule would benefit mostly poor agricultural laborers,
with its costs being paid by consumers.
These two examples of CBA give rise to several observations. First,
EPA, like other government agencies, generally uses a valuation of life
or a range of valuations that are invariant across individuals of different
wealth, even though CBA will on average attach higher valuations to
wealthier people because they can afford to pay more to reduce risk. It
is doubtful in the pesticides case that if EPA had quantified benefits,
it would have attached a lower valuation of life to migrant farm
workers than the national average, even though migrant farm workers
are poorer than the average person. Although sometimes EPA
                                                
22 Id., at 328.
23 Id.
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produces different valuations for different classes of people,24 and
although one can properly rely on national averages when projects
affect everyone in the nation, EPA clearly violated an important
element of CBA.
Second, CBA is frequently hampered by a lack of data or the
difficulty of estimating valuations. A striking example is a CBA that
attempted to monetize the aesthetic value that people attach to clear air
over the Grand Canyon.25 Often, the problem was not that collection
of data was infeasible, but that it was precluded by EPA’s budgetary
and time constraints.
Third, cost-benefit analyses served an important political purpose:
by forcing EPA to state clearly the effects of a regulation, they alerted
affected groups, which would frequently criticize EPA’s estimates.
CBA created regulatory transparency.26 There is also some evidence
that EPA resisted CBA in order to avoid the political trouble that
resulted when affected groups intervened.
Fourth, CBA helped EPA establish priorities. CBA of water
contamination by lead revealed that the health costs were significantly
higher than the costs produced by more politically salient
environmental concerns, such as contamination by radionucleotides.27
Even if one is skeptical about the particular estimates in a CBA, one
might use CBA to rank projects by seriousness on the theory that errors
wash out.
Finally, when EPA did not use CBA, it was never clear what
methodology it relied on. Sometimes, guidance could be found in the
statute. But more often, it appears that EPA relied on a kind of
implicit CBA. On the one hand, a regulation may appear justified as
long as it does not cause too much “economic disruption” to the
affected industry. This appears to mean that the regulation will not
cause either enormous price increases for consumers or numerous
                                                
24 Eloise Trabka Castillo, Mark L. Morris, and Robert S. Raucher, Great Lakes
Water Quality Guidance, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note __, at
419; Leland Deck, Visibility at the Grand Canyon and the Navajo Generating Station,
in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note __, at 267.
25 Deck, supra note __, at 267.
26 See, e.g., id., at 462.
27 See Nichols, supra note __, at 78 (“a week of lead is like a millennium of
radionucleotides”).
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bankruptcies in the affected industry. On the other hand, a regulation
may appear justified as long as one can point to fairly concrete health
effects, like deaths or cancer cases avoided. However, EPA sometimes
issued regulations that caused economic disruption, and often refused
to issue regulations even though they avoid more deaths or cancer cases
than alternative regulations that were issued. It seems likely that even
when EPA refrained from an explicit CBA, it engaged in implicit
tradeoffs that were not articulated or quantified, for it is hard to see
what else EPA could have been doing.
Hahn analyzed 92 rules issued by five agencies between 1990 and
1995, and found that many of these rules would not pass a cost-benefit
test.28 This study is consistent with earlier studies.29 There are a variety
of reasons for these results, and one cannot overstate the difficulties of
evaluating regulations because of problems in evaluating benefits and
determining appropriate discount rates.30 But an important reason
appears to be that agencies often do not monetize benefits, and do not
engage in an explicit CBA.
In sum, although agencies, like EPA, self-consciously engage in
CBA, it is not clear whether their analyses were correctly performed,
according to the traditional understanding of CBA.31 But criticism of
the EPA for deviating from textbook CBA requires a normative theory
of CBA. Otherwise, one cannot exclude the possibility that EPA’s
deviations were normatively justified.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Discussions of CBA are hampered by lack of consistency in the
use of terms. The term “cost-benefit analysis” itself is used to refer to
                                                
28 Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government’s Numbers Tell
Us?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 208 (Robert W. Hahn ed. 1996).
29 See, e.g., John F. Morall, III, A Review of the Record, 10 REGULATION 25
(19986).
30 See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J.
1981 (1998); see also Morrison, supra note __, at 1336-37 (discussing
inconsistency in discounting across agencies).
31 McGarity comes to similar conclusions from his study of regulations issued by
EPA, and also by the Department of Agriculture, the Department of
Transportation, and the Occupational Safety and Healthy Administration. See
McGarity, supra note __, at 174-75.
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the Kaldor-Hicks standard, to the method of compensating or
equivalent variations, and sometimes to any method that requires
trading off costs and benefits rather than relying on absolute standards.
The critiques and defenses of CBA reflect this confusion. Some people
defend CBA because they believe that alternatives do not allow one to
make tradeoffs among values, while others criticize CBA because it is
inconsistent with the Kaldor-Hicks standard.
This section untangles these problems. It starts with a description
of CBA as it is currently understood. We then describe the
conventional defenses of it. We should emphasize at the start that most
defenders of CBA assume that agencies should maximize the
satisfaction of unrestricted preferences, an assumption that is, in our
view, both implausible and unnecessary. These defenders, who are
usually economists, invite criticism from philosophers who reject the
goal of maximizing satisfaction of unrestricted preferences. This debate
is unnecessary, because a commitment to CBA does not depend on the
goal of maximizing unrestricted preferences.
This issue, however, we defer to Part III. This section discusses
the more technical objections to CBA, including the objection that it
does not supply a complete and consistent ordering of projects.
A. What is CBA?
1. Measure of Individual Utility Changes
A project is any government action, including a law or regulation,
that causes a change in the status quo. A project might include the
construction of a new highway, the repair of an old bridge, the creation
of a national health insurance system, investment in research and
development, the enactment of a law against age discrimination—any
action that changes the productive capacities of an economy or the
distribution of wealth. To evaluate a project, we compare the future
“project state of the world” (P) with the “status quo state of the world”
(S). In order to avoid biasing one’s decision in favor of the status quo,
one should imagine that S and P are both “projects” between which
the agency must choose, where the first project involves not changing
the status quo. Any benefits from maintaining the status quo, such as
minimization of uncertainty, should be treated explicitly as benefits that
project S enjoys and project P lacks.
Some people think that a CBA of S and P is conceptually
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straightforward, and the only problem posed by CBA is the practical
difficulty of collecting data. Suppose that P would be the creation of a
new dam. S, the status quo, would mean not constructing the dam.
Clearly, a new dam would create benefits: people would enjoy cheaper
electricity than under S. Just as clearly, a new dam would be costly in
materials and labor that could be used for other projects, and in
environmental degradation as well. One might believe that if one can
accumulate data on these benefits and costs, the CBA itself would be
a simple matter of determining whether the benefits exceed the costs.
Unfortunately, matters are not this straightforward.
To understand how CBA works, one must rely on a more precise
model of the economy. Consider a two good and two person economy,
with goods X and Y, and individuals A and B. P’s effect, relative to S,
will be to change the amount of Y or the amount of X or both.
Usually, a project will not increase both X and Y, but instead increase
the amount of one good while reducing the amount of another.
Holding the endowments of X and Y constant, if P increases the
amount of Y relative to the amount of X, the price of Y (in terms of X)
will fall. The individuals, A and B, experience this change in price as an
increase in amount of purchasing power for Y and a decrease in the
amount of purchasing power for X. Depending on their preferences for
X and Y, this change in purchasing power will make one party better
off and the other worse off, both better off, or both worse off.
In our example of the dam, P represents the construction of the
dam and S represents the decision not to construct the dam. Let Y
represent electricity and X represent fish. It is useful to choose one
good as the numeraire, by which we mean the baseline good which is
used to measure the other goods. If Y is the numeraire, then we talk
about measuring fish in terms of electricity. (X could also be the
numeraire). But, more generally, we think of the numeraire as
representing all the goods in the economy except the other good under
consideration, so if Y is the numeraire, then X represents fish, and Y
represents everything else, which is denominated in dollars. Then we
can measure X in terms of dollars. Although we can thus extend the
two-good case to the real economy without causing analytic problems,
we will stick to the two-good case, despite its lack of realism, because
it is simpler.
P can have a variety of influences on A and B. The construction
of a dam is likely to increase the supply of electricity but reduce the
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supply of fish. This means that the construction of the dam will reduce
the price of electricity in terms of fish or, what is the same thing,
increase the price of fish in terms of electricity. Suppose that in S a
person can trade one fish for one unit of electricity, and that in P a
person can trade one fish for two units of electricity. If A likes
electricity more than fish at the margin, and has a lot of fish and little
electricity, P will make A better off. He can exchange the fish for
electricity at a higher rate than under S. If A likes fish more than
electricity at the margin, and has a lot of electricity and few fish, P will
make A worse off. Whereas under S he can trade one unit of electricity
for one fish, under P he must use up two units of electricity in order to
obtain one more fish. The same comments apply to B. So P can have
four effects on the utility of the two people in the economy. It can
make both better off relative to S, both worse off, A better off and B
worse off, or B better off and A worse off.
Figure 1 illustrates these effects. It shows the effect of the project
on a person, say, person B. Under S, B’s budget line is represented by
mS, which intersects B’s highest indifference curve, uS, at point s*. A
plausible effect of the dam is to make electricity cheaper and fish more
expensive, so if P were implemented, B’s budget line would shift to, say,
mP. The steeper slope reflects the fact that electricity is relatively
cheaper and fish are relatively more expensive. To see how this works,
note that if B does not buy any fish (X=0), then B can buy more
electricity under P than under S (represented by the fact that mP
intersects the y-axis at a higher point than mS does). If B does not buy
any electricity (Y=0), then B can buy fewer fish under P than under S.
Under the indifference curves as drawn, P improves B’s utility. The
project budget line, mP, intersects a higher indifference curve, up (at
point p*). This is just a formal way of showing that the relative decrease
in the cost of electricity benefits B more than the increase in the cost
of fish. But this is not necessary. If the effect on prices were more
extreme (so that mP intersected mS above s*) and B’s preferences were
different, uP could be to the left of uS, so that p* lay behind uS. This
would be the case if B’s relative preference for fish is strong when she
is poor, but declines as her endowments increase. In other words, when
B is poor, she will exchange a lot of electricity for a few fish; when she
becomes wealthier, she will value them more equally, so that she will
exchange only equal amounts. At S, she is relatively wealthy. P
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increases the cost of fish so much, that she will have to exchange a
tremendous amount of the (cheap) electricity in order to satisfy her
increased desire for fish, so much that she is worse off than she was
under S.
CBA requires that the project’s effect on B’s utility be converted
into units on a metric that enables comparison of the project’s effect on
B with its effect on other people. An examination of Figure 1 might
suggest that we want to measure the distance between s* and p*, since
these points lie on the curves that represent B’s utilities under the two
projects. But this distance can be measured only in terms of X and Y:
it is the square root of the sum of the squares of the distances traveled
along the X and Y axes, as one moves from s* and p*. As will become
clear shortly, there is no logical connection between this amount and
the welfare change for A and B.
One possible solution to this problem is to determine how much
mS p*
h*
s*
mP
mH
Figure 1
Y
X
US
UP
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one could take from B in the project state of the world, such that B’s
utility would be reduced from uP to us. To calculate this amount, one
draws a new budget line parallel to mP and tangent to US, which is
labeled mH. Technically, the distance between the points where mP
and mH intersect the y-axis represents the amount of units of Y that
one could take from B in the project world in order to reduce his utility
to the level in the status quo. In our example, Y is electricity, so we have
converted a utility change into an equivalent change in the amount of
electricity that B would consume. At a higher level of abstraction, Y,
as the numeraire, represents all goods except X and is measured in
dollars. So the distance between the points where mP and mH intersect
the y-axis is the amount of dollars that would have to be taken from B
in the project world in order to reduce his utility to its status quo level.
This amount of money is called the compensating variation (CV).
CBA assumes that B’s CV is an adequate representation of the
difference in B’s utility as between the status quo and the project state
of the world.
In our example, B is made better off by P. If B were forced to pay
her CV to someone else, then B would fall back to indifference curve
us. However, B would be at a different point on us than under S; she
would be at point h*. B is consuming more electricity and fewer fish
than under S, but B is no worse off, because electricity is cheaper and
fish are more expensive, thanks to the change in prices caused by P. If
P reduced B to a lower indifference curve, then the CV would be
negative, and represent the amount of money that would be necessary
to raise B’s utility to that of S.
Before turning to the question of how to aggregate the CVs of
multiple parties, we should point out a difficulty with the analysis so
far. In our two-good example we chose to measure the utility effect of
the project by using prices in the project state of the world rather than
prices in the status quo, but we could have taken the opposite approach.
Under the method of equivalent variation (EV), one asks how much
money one must give (or take from) the individual in the status quo, in
order to raise (or lower) his utility level to that of the project state of the
world. Graphically, one draws the hypothetical budget line, mH, parallel
to mS and tangent to the indifference curve UP, rather than parallel to
mP and tangent to US. The distance between the points at which mS
and mH intersect the y-axis represents the EV. There is no theoretical
reason to prefer CV over EV, and the choice between them creates
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some indeterminacy in CBA. However, defenders of CBA point out
that the data used to calculate CVs and EVs are so crude that, as a
practical matter, the two measures will produce similar results.
The difference between CV and EV results from income effects.
As a person obtains more goods, his relative preferences among goods
may change. For example, a relatively poor person who has few fish and
few units of electricity may initially be indifferent between obtaining
one more unit of one good and one more unit of the other, because he
values an additional unit of each good equally; but as he obtains more
and more units of both goods, he may begin to prefer electricity, which
can be used to power his television set, to fish, for which he no longer
has an appetite. As income increases, a person will not necessarily want
to continue to consume two goods at the same rate. It seems reasonable
to assume that preferences for most, if not all, goods follow this
pattern, and therefore that CV and EV will almost always diverge.
Thus, cost-benefit analyses that rely on CV may produce different
results from analyses that rely on EV.32
2. Aggregation
The reason for determining B’s CV is to enable a comparison of
the effect of P and S on B and A. Recall that in our example P placed
B on a higher indifference curve. Now P might also place A on a
higher indifference curve, in which case P is Pareto superior to S. We
will discuss Pareto superiority below. For now it is sufficient to note
that Pareto superiority may be a sufficient condition for approving a
project, but few, if any, actual projects are Pareto superior to the status
quo, and the reason for using CBA is that the Pareto standard cannot
be used to evaluate the vast majority of government projects. For the
purpose of example, we must suppose that P injures someone, and since
it benefits B, we assume that it hurts A. Because A, a fisherman, loves
fish more than electricity, P’s effect of increasing the price of fish in
terms of electricity reduces the extent to which A can satisfy his
preferences. A’s CV is calculated in the same way that B’s CV is
                                                
32 An additional problem is that people may, for poorly understood psychological
reasons, be willing to pay more for a good than they are willing to accept to give
up the same good, holding everything else equal. (CV and EV are measures of
WTP if positive; and WTA if negative.) See Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L.
Spitzer, Willingness to Pay Vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications,
71 WASH. U.L.Q. 59 (1993).
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calculated, but this time CV is a negative number. We would have to
give A money in the project state of the world in order to make him as
well off as he was in the status quo, unlike B, from whom we had to
take money. Then we approve the project if the sum of A’s CV and B’s
CV exceeds zero; otherwise, the project is rejected.
Figure 2 depicts this analysis. The two curves are utility possibility
curves (UPC). They measure the amounts of utility that A and B can
jointly obtain under different technologies. Given a particular
production technology, one can give all the goods either to A or B
(represented by the intersections of the curve at the axes) or one can
split the goods between them. UPCS represents possible utility
distributions in the status quo, and UPCP represents utility distributions
in the project state. Points s and p represent the distributions of utility
in the status quo and under the project. If p were in the quadrant
northeast of s (for example, where s´ is), then p would be Pareto
superior to s. Both parties would have higher utility under P than under
S. In our example, however, p must be below and to the right of s, in
order to represent the fact that the project makes B better off and A
worse off. The question is whether the project makes B sufficiently
better off, relative to A. CBA tells us that p does make B better off by
an amount greater than the amount by which it makes A worse off.
This can be shown graphically. If the state implements the project and
it can engage in costless lump-sum transfers, it can move the utility
distribution from the status quo (s) to the project state of the world (p),
and thence along UPCP to a hypothetical world (p´) which is Pareto
superior to the status quo. This procedure shows that after the
hypothetical transfer, both A and B are better off than in the status
quo.
One should be clear about what one shows by aggregating CVs.
One does not show in a straightforward way that B’s well-being is
enhanced more than A’s well-being is reduced. Rather, one shows that
B satisfies her preferences to a greater extent under P than under S,
that A satisfies his preferences to a smaller extent under P than under
S, and that B’s improvement is such that B could more than
compensate A for his loss. One reason for this result may be that B’s
preference for the electricity made cheaper by P is more intense than B’s
preference for the good made more expensive by P. B prefers electricity
much more than fish; A is close to indifferent. Thus, if B gave A some
extra units of electricity, A would be compensated for his loss of fish
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and B would still be better off. Holding everything else equal, this
difference in intensity of preferences—so long as unrestricted
preferences are entitled to respect33—may justify a project that makes
electricity a lot cheaper and fish a little more expensive.
But another reason for the result may be that as B accumulates
more fish and electricity, her relative preference for electricity
increases—her stomach being full of fish, she wants to watch more
television—whereas A, at a low endowment, is indifferent between
fish and electricity but still highly desirous of both. A needs fish for
food and electricity for warmth, and wants them intensely, but also
wants them equally, so he is not willing to give up a lot of one good in
order to obtain a little of the other. One’s CV reflects not just the
relative intensities of one’s preferences, but how these preferences
                                                
33 This is a controversial proposition, which we discuss in Part III.
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change as one’s endowments increase. And yet this strikes a false chord.
If B has plenty of fish but a modest appetite, she may be willing to
trade lots of fish at the margin for a little electricity. So she is willing
to pay a lot for P. Meanwhile, A does not have very many fish or much
electricity, and values fish slightly more than electricity, but still values
both a great deal. P makes him worse off, because he must reduce his
consumption of fish, and the increased warmth does not offset that
loss. But he is not willing to pay much (in terms of electricity units) to
avoid P, because at his low endowment electricity matters as much to
him as fish do. At a more abstract level, wealthier people have higher
CVs for projects than poorer people do, because they value their last
dollar less than poorer people do. Millionaires do not value $100 as
much as poor people do; therefore, millionaires would be willing to pay
$100 for a project that increases their utility slightly, and poor people
would not be willing to pay $100 to prevent the same project, even
though that project may reduce their utility quite a bit.34
Some scholars argue that this bias in favor of wealthy people is a
decisive objection to CBA.35 One response is that if CBA benefits
wealthier people more than poor people, but at the same time makes
wealthier people better off by more than it makes poor people worse
off, the bias can be reversed through redistribution of wealth, in which
case enough people will be better off as a result. This response correctly
points out that an undesired consequence of CBA can be remedied, but
it does not deal with the deeper philosophical difficulty, which is that
CBA may not measure anything that we care about. CBA reflects both
preference intensity, which we do care about, and wealth, which we do
not care about; but can these influences be untangled?
Before answering this question, we should point out some
practical consequences of this philosophical difficulty. Suppose that our
two people, A and B, have the following endowments in S and P, of
the two goods, X and Y:
                                                
34 It is not the case that wealthier people will always have higher CVs for a given
project than poor people do. To give a simple example, a project that generates one
dollar for a wealthy person and takes one dollar from a poor person, will produce
equal CVs for the wealthy person and the poor person—one dollar. The bias
discussed in the text refers to a tendency over a large number of different projects.
35 See C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5
PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 3 (1975).
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A B
S 2, 0 0, 1
P 1, 0 0, 2
If X refers to fish, and Y refers to units of electricity, then the
project of building a dam can be seen as reducing the number of fish
from 2 to 1 and increasing the units of electricity from 1 to 2. B is a
steel mill owner who benefits from cheap electricity if the dam is
constructed and A is a fisherman who benefits if the dam is not
constructed. We make the plausible assumptions that for a particular
good each party prefers more of that good to less of that good, and that
each party prefers equal amounts of each good to unequal amounts of
each good, that is, that each party obtains diminishing marginal utility
from consumption of a good.
An agency must choose between S and P. If P is implemented,
then B obtains an extra unit of electricity. If this unit were costlessly
transferred to A, then A’s utility would exceed his status quo utility,
because A prefers (1,1) to (2,0). Meanwhile, B would be no worse off,
with (0,1), than in the status quo. Therefore, P is superior to S.
However, if S is implemented, then A obtains an extra unit of fish. If
this unit were costlessly transferred to B, then B’s utility would exceed
her status quo utility, because B prefers (1,1) to (0,2). Meanwhile, A
would be no worse off, with (1,0), than in the status quo. Therefore,
S is superior to P. Accordingly, the agency has no grounds for
preferring S or P. This problem is called the “Scitovsky paradox.”36
The Scitovsky paradox is illustrated in Figure 2. As we saw above,
P defeats S, because the costless redistribution of p, p´, is northeast of
s. But S also defeats P, because the costless redistribution of s, s´, is
northeast of p. As long as the utility possibility curves cross, this
indeterminacy is possible. Utility curves do not cross when preferences
are identical and homothetic, which means that a person’s relative
demand for a good does not change with income. It is clear, however,
                                                
36 See Tibor Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON.
STUD. 77 (1941); our example is taken from Yew-Kwang Ng, WELFARE
ECONOMICS: INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC CONCEPTS  59-
66 (1980). See also Robin Boadway and Neil Bruce, WELFARE ECONOMICS 96-
101 (1984).
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 22
that people’s preferences are not identical and homothetic.37
To understand the challenge posed by the Scitovksy paradox, one
must recall that the original purpose of CBA and related concepts of
economic efficiency was to separate problems of distribution and
problems of wealth or welfare improvement. Economists hoped to
distinguish efficiency questions, which their expertise qualified them to
address, and distributive questions, to which economic learning had
nothing to contribute. The claim was not that distributional questions
were unimportant, and that redistribution of wealth was unjustified; it
was rather that the economist had nothing useful to say about how
wealth should be distributed.38
Thus, it has never been an objection to efficiency standards that
they cannot evaluate purely redistributive projects. For example, suppose
the government proposes a project that would change {(1,0), (3,3)} for
A and B, to {(2,2), (2,1)}. This project does not pass a cost-benefit test,
because A cannot overcompensate B from his gain; but this only means
that the project cannot be justified on efficiency grounds but only (if
at all) on distributive grounds. The economist does not condemn this
project; he or she expresses no opinion about it. A line of thought does
hold that when the government wants to redistribute wealth, the most
cost-effective way of doing so is through taxes and transfers, rather
than the building of dams in poor areas or toxic waste dumps in rich
areas.39 But the choice of how much wealth to redistribute is outside
the economist’s area of expertise.
We are less interested in the role of the economist as in the role of
the government agency, but an analogous argument holds. When the
Environmental Protection Agency or the Food and Drug
Administration decides whether to approve a project, it might seem
that it should do so on the basis of overall well-being (however
defined), and not as a way to redistribute wealth from one segment of
the population to another. If wealth should be redistributed,
independent efforts to do so by uncoordinated agencies seem less likely
to succeed than adjustment of taxes and welfare benefits by Congress.
                                                
37 Indeed, UPCs may cross multiple times, which can happen under plausible
assumptions about preferences. See Little, supra note __, at 107-08.
38 See supra note __.
39 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
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The purpose of CBA is to separate out the distributional issue and
isolate the efficiency issue, so that the agency will evaluate projects
solely on the basis of their efficiency.40
But there remains the question whether such a separation is
possible. The Scitovsky Paradox arises because the efficiency effect of
a project is not independent of its distributional effect. When a project
has a sufficient effect on a person’s wealth, it will change how much
that person values some goods relative to other goods, which means
that in the project world he or she will have a new CV for going back
to the status quo. This new CV will not be the same as the CV for
going from the status quo to the project world. If the other party’s CV
changes in the right way, the reversal will occur. The reversal will not
necessarily occur. It will not occur if, for example, a project’s effect on
people’s endowments is small, or the people affected by the project have
similar endowments.41 But even if the reversal will not occur, its
possibility haunts the entire project of CBA, because it shows that
people’s valuations depend on their relative wealth as well as on the
intensity of their preferences.42 If you care about overall welfare in the
ordinary meaning of that term, you should care about satisfying intense
preferences, but there is no reason to care about satisfying the
preferences of wealthier people more than the preferences of poorer
people.
When an agency makes a decision, its decision will have definite
distributional effects even assuming that Congress could later make
costless lump-sum transfers. If the economy is at point s,
implementation of the project forces Congress to choose a distribution
                                                
40 This is a common view. See, e.g., Kaldor, supra note __; A. Harberger, Three
Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretative Essay, 9 J. Econ.
Lit. 785 (1971); E. Mishan, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1992).
41 Cf. Neil Bruce and R.G. Harris, Cost-Benefit Criteria and the Compensation
Principle in Evaluating Small Projects, 90 J. POL. ECON. 755 (1982).
42 See Blackorby and Donaldson, supra note __, at 490-91, for a clear statement
of this point. Some economists simply argue that a project should not be approved
when approval would lead to a Scitovsky paradox. See, e.g., Scitovsky, supra note
__; Little, supra note __, at 112 (who also requires a distributive criterion). This
approach does not remove all difficulties: it can produce intransitivities, where
project A dominates B, B dominates C, and C dominates A. See Boadway and
Bruce, supra note __, at 99-100. As the test becomes more rigorous, it produces
fewer such inconsistencies, but also enables fewer comparisons of projects.
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along UPCP: for example, p´, p (if Congress favors B), or anywhere else
along this curve. However, Congress may believe that the optimal
distribution is at s´ or any nearby point. By implementing the project,
the agency prevents Congress from reaching s´, whereas if it did not
implement the project, Congress would be able to reach s´. The
agency, by hypothesis, has no grounds for preferring p´ over s´;
therefore, it should not take an action that affects Congress’ ability to
reach s´ or p´. That is, it should not, if it is not permitted to make
distributive judgments. But the point is that the agency must make
some decision, and since its decision affects distribution, it should take
distributional considerations into account. So the whole project of
enabling agencies to make efficiency judgments, while permitting
them to avoid distributional judgments, is impossible.43
B. The Conventional Defenses of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Economists have defended CBA in several ways. These defenses
all have in common an implicit commitment to the view that people’s
unrestricted preferences should be respected.44 We should make clear
that we reject this view. However, because the view is important, and
the conventional defenses contain several influential ideas, we will
spend this section describing and criticizing them. We classify these
defenses as the Pareto defense, the Kaldor-Hicks defense, and the
utilitarian defense.
                                                
43 For the sake of brevity, we do not address several other objections to cost-
benefit that have been influential in the literature. These objections include
criticisms of CBA’s treatment of (i) risk, (ii) the discounting of future benefits,
and (iii) valuation of life and other hard-to-measure goods. For discussions, see,
e.g., Herman B. Leonard and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied
to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in VALUES AT RISK (Douglas MacLean ed.
1986) (on risk); Richard Layard and Stephen Glaister, Introduction, in COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (Richard Layard and Stephen Glaister eds. 1994) (on
discounting); and W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992) (valuation of life).
44 Notable exceptions include Harsanyi, see J.C. Harsanyi, Game and Decision
Theoretic Models in Ethics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH
ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 703-04 (Robert J. Aumann and Sergui Hart eds.
1992), and Sen, see Amartya Sen, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL
WELFARE ch. 4 (1982). Although both scholars appear to support CBA, at least
under certain conditions, neither of them has attempted to reconcile his views
with the traditional approach to CBA.
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1. The Pareto Defense
A standard defense of CBA is that it provides a sufficient
approximation of Pareto superior projects. This argument naturally
assumes that the Pareto standard is ethically desirable. Let us begin
with that claim.
At first sight, the Pareto standard appears normatively attractive.
A project that harms no one, and makes at least one person better off,
is consistent with a wide variety of moral commitments, including
classical liberalism and utilitarianism. It seems to be consistent with
common-sense morality.
Standard objections to the Pareto principle include the obvious
point that people may make incorrect choices, so their indifference
curves will not describes distributions that are systematically related to
their actual welfare. A drug addict may reach a higher indifference
curve as a result of a project that reduces the price of drugs, but most
people would condemn such a project rather than support it. Another
objection is that a Pareto superior allocation may be distributively
unjust. A project that generates $1000 for a rich person and nothing
for a poor person aggravates wealth inequality. A third objection is that
the Pareto standard assumes a commitment to ethical individualism,
with the satisfaction of preferences taking priority over the
enhancement of community values. But, it is claimed, ethical
individualism does not accord with our moral intuitions. The standard
responses to these claims are that agencies should sometimes ignore
distorted preferences or that preferences are not usually distorted; the
government can redistribute wealth in order to achieve distributive
justice; and ethical individualism does so accord with our moral
intuitions. We address this debate in Part III.
More significant, for our purposes, is the problem that the Pareto
standard cannot supply a sufficiently complete ordering of projects. It
is likely that the Pareto standard would reject desirable projects that
would be approved under an uncontroversial social welfare function.
For example, a vaccine that improved the health of millions of people
but required a tax of $1 on someone unaffected (who is not altruistic)
would violate the Pareto standard but be required by any plausible moral
theory. (Suppose that the unaffected person could not be excused from
the tax except at great administrative cost resulting in such high taxes
for everyone else that the vaccine would no longer improve their well-
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being.) All utility-enhancing government projects probably violate the
Pareto standard. Although one might argue that Pareto superiority
could be a sufficient condition for a project, we doubt that this claim
is of any importance, since the Pareto standard is almost completely
indeterminate.
This is where CBA comes in. Defenders of CBA argue that CBA
provides a useful approximation of the Pareto standard, while also
allowing a more complete ordering (though, as we saw, not a fully
complete ordering). People have proposed two arguments that CBA
approximates the Pareto standard.
The first argument is that although CBA does not require the
losers to be compensated, the government can (and should)
compensate the losers by taxing the winners after the project is
implemented. The problem with this argument is that if the
government can and does tax the winners and compensate the losers,
the project is Pareto superior to the status quo and CBA is not
necessary. But, as we saw, very few projects are truly Pareto superior,
because the administrative costs of identifying everyone injured by a
project and transferring money to those people from the winners
would overwhelm the project’s benefits.
The second argument is that people will expect in the aggregate,
over time, to be benefited by projects as often as they are injured by
projects.45 A government that uses CBA will thus, in general, have
“wealthier” citizens than a government that fails to use CBA. Suppose
we must decide today whether for now on the government should use
CBA. If CBA increases the wealth of everyone in the aggregate, then
every person expects ex ante to be better off with CBA than without
it. In this ex ante sense, CBA is Pareto-superior to the status quo. The
problem with this argument is that in a many-good economy, CBA
will tend to favor people who have a low opportunity cost for money
and intense preferences. There is no reason to believe that the people
who usually injured by projects are usually the same as the people who
are usually benefited by projects. And although the government might
redistribute wealth through the welfare system, there is no reason to
believe that the beneficiaries of welfare are the same as the people
                                                
45 See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensation Criteria, 86 Q.J. ECON.
407 (1972), for an attempt to formalize this idea, which goes back to Hicks, supra
note __.
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injured by projects implemented by the government. Thus, the Pareto
standard will not be satisfied.
Another line of thought accepts the force of these criticisms and
argues that CVs should be calculated using distributional weights. One
possibility is to multiply a person’s CV by his marginal utility of money.
Because poor people have higher marginal utilities of money than do
rich people, the weighting system will inflate their CVs relative to
those of rich people, with the result that approval of projects would not
be biased in favor of rich people. The problem here is that of
determining people’s marginal utilities of money. Most economists
appear to believe that the difficulties that would be involved are
insurmountable, and so this scheme and related schemes have not had
much influence.46 Another possibility is to give the agency the power
to make distributive judgments, and forbid it to approve projects that
would worsen the existing distribution of wealth.47 But this standard
would be too restrictive, preventing the approval of projects that may
have detrimental but tiny effects on the distribution of wealth while
helping a great many of people in a significant way. Because the
literature in this area is inconclusive and has not had much influence
on government policy, we will not pursue this line of argument.
2. The Kaldor-Hicks Defense
Some scholars defend CBA on the grounds that it approximates
the Kaldor-Hicks standard. The Kaldor-Hicks standard states that a
project is desirable if it makes the winners better off by an amount
sufficient to overcompensate the losers, if the losers could be
compensated through a costless lump-sum transfer. More precisely,
state P Kaldor-Hicks dominates state S if it is possible to (costlessly)
redistribute goods in state P so as to produce a distribution that is
Pareto superior to the distribution in state s. Looking at Figure 2, note
that Kaldor-Hicks ranks Project p over Pareto noncomparable Project
s. To see why, observe that a costless redistribution of the bundle of
goods represented by p would allow a move to p´, which is Pareto-
superior to s.48 This defense assumes that the Kaldor-Hicks standard
                                                
46 See Little, supra note __, at 120-28.
47 Little proposes such a criterion, although he is not speaking specifically about
agencies. See id., at 112.
48 We avoid two complications. First, the Kaldor-Hicks standard actually refers
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is normatively defensible. The difference between CBA and Kaldor-
Hicks is that CBA uses money as the numeraire, whereas Kaldor-
Hicks, a more general criterion, does not use a numeraire.
Most economists appear to concede that the Kaldor-Hicks
standard is not, by itself, normatively desirable.49 The problem with the
Kaldor-Hicks standard is that hypothetical compensation is not real
compensation. The loser when a project is approved is not consoled by
his compensation in a hypothetical world; the Kaldor-Hicks standard
lacks precisely what makes the Pareto standard attractive.
So the Kaldor-Hicks standard is usually defended by reference to
the Pareto standard. Indeed, it is often called the “potential Pareto”
standard. The argument is that although an individual might lose as a
result of one project, he or she is also likely to win as the result of
another project, so over time the gains and losses will even out, and
everyone (or almost everyone) will be better off if the Kaldor-Hicks
standard is used than if some alternative were used. In addition,
distributive problems can be solved with the tax and welfare system. But
this argument is no different from the claim that CBA approximates
the Pareto standard, an argument we rejected in the prior section. As
noted above, the only difference between using CVs and using the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion is that the former uses money as a numeraire,
whereas the latter does not use a numeraire; but this difference does not
affect the conclusion that the standards are biased in favor of people
who are wealthier (in money or goods). Moreover, justifying CBA on
the basis of Kaldor-Hicks is harder than justifying Kaldor-Hicks on
the basis of the Pareto principle, because, as Boadway has shown, CBA
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for Kaldor-Hicks.50 But this
argument, and the literature it has spawned, is not of any practical
                                                              
loosely to two separate standards, the Kaldor standard and the Hicks standard. The
choice between Kaldor and Hicks parallels the choice between CV and EV, and
introduces further indeterminacy. Second, we ignore the debate about whether the
hypothetical transfer should be considered costless or should be understood to
require the costly redistributive instruments at the government’s disposal—a debate
which, in our view, is idle.
49 See, e.g., Charles Blackorby and David Donaldson, A Review Article: The Case
Against the Use of the Sum of Compensating Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23
CANADIAN J. ECON. 471, 472 (1990).
50 Robin W. Boadway, The Welfare Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 84 ECON.
J. 426 (1974).
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interest. Because Kaldor-Hicks is, taken as a moral principle,
indefensible, CBA cannot be justified by reference to Kaldor-Hicks.
To defend CBA, one must appeal to some other moral principle.51
3. The (Unrestricted) Utilitarian Defense
A final defense of CBA is that CBA is justified assuming a
commitment to utilitarianism with unrestricted preferences. We do not
know of any sustained defenses of this position, but it seems to be
implicit in the work of some authors.52 We also do not think that this
version of utilitarianism is plausible. But assuming it were, how could
CBA be defended on the ground of unrestricted utilitarianism?
Initially, we must define what we mean by utilitarianism. Classical
utilitarians like Bentham and Mill used the concept of utility to refer
to a distinct mental state, something like a feeling of happiness or well-
being. Maximizing aggregate utility, then, meant increasing the
happiness of as many people as possible. In principle, the amount of
happiness that a person has could be quantified. For reasons that we
discuss in Part III, most modern economists reject this view. Modern
economists hold that utility refers to the extent that a person satisfies
his or her (unrestricted) preferences. A utility function ranks states of
the worlds according to the extent to which a person satisfies these
preferences. Thus, modern utility is ordinal rather than cardinal. This
means that if by reducing the price of fish, we increase a person’s utility
function or (what is generally the same thing) raise that person to a
higher indifference curve, we cannot say how much better off is that
person, but only that he or she is better off. Indeed, to be more precise,
we can say only that the person can satisfy his or her (unrestricted)
                                                
51 We do not pursue here an argument that Kaldor-Hicks is justified on the basis
of hypothetical consent, see Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of
the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980),
and, for criticisms, see, e.g, Jules Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980); or that it is consistent with
people’s moral intuitions. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and
Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979), and, for criticisms, see, e.g., Ronald
Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980). Other contributions
to this debate can be found in Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, supra
note __.
52 See Pearce and Nash, supra note __, at pp. 26-27. Pearce and Nash do not
themselves accept this approach. Id.
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preferences to a greater degree. But even if we assume that we, as
utilitarians, want to do this for as many people as possible, we run into
a problem. The problem is there is no non-arbitrary method for
ranking social states on the basis of their effect on the ordinal utility
functions of all people.53 For any given project, some people will prefer
it to other projects and other people will prefer the other projects to the
first project. An agency that obtained sincere answers to questions
about people’s ranking of the projects would not be able to use that
information to rank the projects in a non-arbitrary way.
This result is best understood to be a problem about information.54
Welfare economists like to assume ordinal utilities, rather than cardinal
utilities, because the former place much less demand on the capacity of
the decision-maker to obtain information. To compare cardinal
utilities, the decision-maker must have some idea about how much
“happiness” or “welfare” a person would experience under alternative
states of the world, and be able to compare this level of utility with the
utilities of other people. To compare ordinal utilities, the decision-
maker must have some idea about whether a project increases one
person’s satisfaction of his preferences by “more” than it reduces some
other person’s satisfaction of preferences. Some economists
controversially have argued that such interpersonal comparisons of
welfare are impossible.55 More plausibly, they are just very so hard.56
They are so hard that an agency that insisted that a project made some
people happier by an amount greater than the amount of happiness lost
by other people would have a hard time persuading anyone of the basis
for its conclusions.
Still, one can make sense of the idea that agencies should use
                                                
53 See Kenneth Arrow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
54 Arrow’s theorem can be evaded by assuming the possibility of interpersonal
comparability. See Anandarup Ray, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: ISSUES AND
METHODOLOGIES 33 (1984).
55 See Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 43 ECON.
JOURNAL 635 (1938). For a discussion and criticism of Robbins’ position, see
Little, supra note __, at 50-66. A recent article states that “most economists think
interpersonal comparisons are nonsense.” Robert A. Pollak, Welfare Comparisons
and Situation Comparisons, 50 J. ECONOMETRICS 31 (1991). However, the author,
who is himself agnostic on the matter, id., at 39, does not supply citations, and
we have not found recently published work that makes such a strong claim.
56 See Pollak, supra note __, at 37-43, for a discussion of the difficulties.
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CBA in order to maximize utility. Suppose that every person in society
has identical endowments. Then it can plausibly be assumed that each
values an extra dollar by the same amount. People’s CVs would reflect
their utilities exactly, and a project that passed a CBA would also
increase aggregate utility. Now suppose that people’s endowments are
not identical. In order to aggregate utility, one could not use CVs,
because they are distorted by the differences in endowments. A rich
person might be willing to pay more for a project than a poor person
is, yet it is likely that his marginal utility of money is less than the poor
person’s, so approval of the project would result in a reduction in
aggregate utility. In principle, one could weight CVs in order to
eliminate this distortion, but in order to determine the proper
weighting system, an agency would have to determine everyone’s
marginal utilities of money. Most economists appear to believe that
such a determination would be too difficult.57 So economists are faced
with a Hobson’s choice. One branch of the literature proposes that
economists should evaluate projects on the basis of social welfare
functions that include proper distributional weightings. Utility is
assumed to be cardinal under this approach: different people’s utilities
can be weighted and summed. This approach is, in a sense,
intellectually rigorous, but it is not useful because it is too demanding
on the decision-maker, and one does not observe agencies (or anyone
else, as far as we know) using such ambitious social welfare functions
in the real world. The other branch of the literature holds that
economists should evaluate projects on the basis of unweighted CVs.58
This approach, for which ordinal utilities are sufficient, is perhaps less
intellectually respectable, but has had more influence. The pure
approach is impractical; the practical approach is impure. It is relatively
straightforward to aggregate and compare CVs, but the outcome does
not necessarily tell one whether a project enhances welfare, whether
understood ordinally or cardinally.59
                                                
57 See Pearce and Nash, supra note __, at 27. A powerful critique can be found in
Little, supra note __, at 120-27.
58 That is, the social welfare function does not include distributional weightings.
59 Most textbooks on CBA recommend distributive weighting and discuss various
methods. See, e.g., Boadway and Bruce, supra note __, at 271-91; D.W. Pearce
and C.A. Nash, THE SOCIAL APPRAISAL OF PROJECTS 31-37 (1981); Richard
O. Zerbe, Jr., and Dwight D. Dively, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN THEORY
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Finally, it is worth mentioning an argument that, we believe, has
currency among economists although it is rarely defended in print.
This argument is that CBA is desirable because there are no superior
alternatives that provide determinate, or relatively determinate,
prescriptions.60 This argument assumes that if agencies engaged in
some sort of direction utilitarian regulation, they would be unlikely to
evaluate projects in a consistent way. If CBA provides only a feeble
approximation of utilitarianism, that is better than no guidance at all.
This argument might seem odd. Why would a poor guide be
better than no guide at all? If someone proposed a method that
required the approval of all projects whose titles have at least 20 letters
and the disapproval of all projects whose titles have fewer than 20
letters, the method would produce determinate results but not desirable
ones. One way to understand this argument is to imagine that a person
is lost in the woods. Having no theory about how to get out of the
woods, he or she walks around randomly. A method that does not tell
the person how to get out of the woods may still be helpful. It is
                                                              
AND PRACTICE 236-53 (1994). However, they do not show that the weighting
systems are practical, and indeed many textbooks express doubts about their
practicality. See, e.g., Mishan supra note __; Anandarup Ray, COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: ISSUES AND METHODOLOGIES 22-31 (1984); Robert Sugden and
Alan Williams, THE PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
206-07 (1978). So the literature leaves one in doubt about what a proper CBA
entails. As mentioned in the text, agencies do not appear to use explicit
distributional weightings of the sort recommended by textbooks, although they
may engage in such weightings surreptitiously or informally. See the discussion
of pesticide regulation, supra note __, and accompanying text. Some scholars argue
that the economist should not use distributive weights but should disaggregate the
costs and benefits of a project for particular groups, and allow the policy maker
decide whether its distributional consequences are acceptable. See, e.g., A.R. Prest
and R. Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 ECON. J. 683, 701-02 (1965).
60 See Alan Williams, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Bastard Science? And/or Insidious Poison
in the Body Politick?, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 199 (1972). Some scholars have proposed
alternatives. See, e.g., G. Munda, P. Nijkamp, and P. Rietveld, Information
Precision and Multicriteria Evaluation Methods, in EFFICIENCY IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 43 (Alan
Williams and Emilio Giardinia eds. 1993); V. Kerry Smith, A Conceptual
Overview of the Foundations of Benefit-Cost Analysis, in BENEFITS ASSESSMENT:
THE STATE OF THE ART 13, 27-31 (Judith D. Bentkover, Vincent T. Covello,
and Jeryl Mumpower eds. 1986). We discuss these and other alternatives in Part
III.
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apparently the case that when people are lost, they tend to walk in
circles. Whatever the true path out of the woods, walking in circles is
inferior to walking in a straight line. So a method that enabled a
person to avoid walking in circles (for example, walk toward some
landmark) is superior to no method at all. Similarly, CBA may enable
agencies to avoid certain errors—like the tendency to exaggerate certain
benefits and to ignore certain costs—without actually telling the
agency whether a project is desirable. The critics of CBA, however,
reply that while this is possible, it is not likely. For them, CBA is like
a method for leaving the woods that is no better than random. For
example, a method that tells one to rely on a divining rod, or one that
tells one to walk in figure eights, is no better than random. The
argument that CBA is better than an alternative cannot be made
independently of a theoretical defense of it and a comparison to its
rivals. That is the burden of the Part III.
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
In this Part, we argue that CBA is properly conceptualized as a
welfarist decision-procedure. We defend the following claims: (1) the
effect of a governmental project on overall well-being is a morally
relevant, if not morally decisive feature of the project; (2) CBA is
plausibly the decision-procedure best justified in light of overall well-
being, in a significant fraction of agency choice situations. We do not
claim that CBA is always best justified in light of overall well-being.
On the other hand, CBA has certain distinct advantages, relative to
other decision-procedures, which suggest that it will be routinely if not
universally appropriate.
Our conception of CBA has a number of salient features. First, we
conceive of CBA as a decision-procedure, not a criterion of moral
rightness or goodness. The fact that a project has a positive sum of
compensating variations says nothing at all, even prima facie, about the
moral worth of the project. The criterion of overall well-being, and
other true moral criteria, are conceptually distinct from the sum-of-
CVs test. For example, as we discussed above, the project winners
might be rich and the project losers might be poor, such that the
winners would be willing to pay large sums in dollars for trivial welfare
benefits, and the losers would require smaller sums for larger welfare
harms. Yet it is a large mistake to leap from the premise that CBA lacks
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bedrock moral status, to the conclusion that agencies ought not employ
CBA as a decision-procedure. CBA might be sufficiently accurate in
tracking the welfare effect of projects that—notwithstanding the
conceptual slippage between CBA and overall well-being—it is the best
procedure for agencies to use, given the relative cheapness and
transparency of CBA.
Second, our conception severs any link between CBA, and the
two purported moral criteria most familiar to modern economists:
namely, Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto-superiority. Again, the
considerations motivating this stance were discussed in Part II. Kaldor-
Hicks is not, in truth, a moral criterion; the fact that the winners from
the project could compensate the losers does not, without more, mean
that the project is a good one, even prima facie. As for the criterion of
Pareto-superiority: although that does mark out something morally
significant, it is a criterion of limited scope. It leaves unranked projects
that have both welfare winners and losers, as agency projects typically
do.
Rather, our conception ties CBA to a much older criterion than
Kaldor-Hicks or Pareto-superiority, a criterion with an impressive
philosophical pedigree: overall well-being. Modern economists are often
uncomfortable with that criterion, because of the standard claim about
the impossibility of interpersonal welfare comparisons. That claim is
wrong, as we shall argue at length below. All of us regularly compare
welfare gains and losses, across persons, and indeed a conception of
welfare that precluded such comparisons would be unreasonable.
We should emphasize that by asserting the possibility of
interpersonal welfare comparisons, and the moral relevance of overall
well-being, we are not committing ourselves to the truth of
utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the view that overall well-being is
morally decisive: the only important feature of a project is its effect on
aggregate welfare. Our view, a considerably weaker one, is that overall
well-being is morally relevant: government should choose a welfare-
improving project, but all things considered, non-welfarist
considerations (for example, distributive or deontological
considerations) may properly lead to the ultimate rejection of that
project. CBA is a decision-procedure by which agencies implement one
of the several normative criteria that, together, determine the all-
things-considered normative status of the project.
Finally, as should become clearer below, our conception of CBA
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is distinctive because we detach CBA from preferences. The concept of
preference is foundational to modern economics, both positive
economics (where actors are assumed to maximize satisfaction of their
preferences) and normative or welfare economics (where satisfying
preferences is assumed to make persons better off). This may or may be
not appropriate in the first case B we take no position on that, because
our project here is normative, not positive B but we do claim that the
preference-satisfaction view of welfare is wrong. More precisely, as we
shall explain, the standard, economic view that makes welfare depend
upon the satisfaction of unrestricted preferences is quite misguided. But
this is not a difficulty for CBA, because CBA is agnostic across
different conceptions of well-being. The idea of measuring a project’s
effect on overall well-being by monetizing the effect on each
individual, and then aggregating, does not presuppose an unrestricted
preference-based view of well-being, or indeed any preference-based
view at all. To put the point another way: the “compensating
variations” summed to determine the overall costs and benefits of a
project should be defined, not as a person’s willingness to pay or accept
(which presupposes a preference-based view of welfare), but as her
welfare equivalent (leaving open what the right theory of welfare is).61
We proceed as follows. Section A describes different theories of
well-being, and criticizes the unrestricted preference-based view.
Section B and C address, respectively, two different objections to the
purported moral criterion of overall well-being. The first is the
conceptual objection that interpersonal welfare comparisons are
impossible. The second is the normative objection that, conceding the
possibility of such comparisons, overall well-being is nonetheless
morally irrelevant. In Section D, we flesh out the distinction between
decision-procedures and moral criteria, and discuss how CBA
(understood as a welfarist decision-procedure) should be defined. In
Section E, we compare CBA with alternative decision-procedures B
for example, with direct implementation of the welfare criterion; with
nonaggregative procedures; with unidimensional procedures; and with
                                                
61 Actually, this is just a first cut at our position. More precisely, CVs should be
defined as either welfare equivalents, or as WTP/WTA to the extent the latter
measure tracks welfare equivalents with sufficient accuracy and is cheaper, more
transparent, more reliably implemented, and so forth. See infra text accompanying
note __.
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other multidimensional procedures B and highlight CBA’s advantages,
in accuracy, cost, and transparency, relative to these other procedures,
in light of overall well-being. Finally, in Section F, we briefly discuss
the problem of bringing nonwelfarist criteria, such as deontological or
distributive criteria, to bear on agency choices.
Before we proceed, a terminological point is in order. The term
“welfarist” is used, throughout this Part, as a synonym for “relative to
overall well-being.” “Welfarism,” in our terminology, is the view that
overall well-being is morally relevant. Hence our description of CBA
as a welfarist decision procedure. The terms are sometimes, not always,
used this way in the philosophical literature; in any event, this is the
way they will be used here.
A. Well-Being: Desire, Pleasure and Objective Value
Philosophers standardly divide theories of well-being into three
types: desire-based theories, objective-list theories, and hedonic
theories.62 Theories of well-being can be used for various purposes. We
are interested, in this Article, in their use for illuminating the problem
of comparative well-being.63 CBA is a technique by which agencies
compare two or more options: options such as issuing various possible
rules, or issuing no rule; spending money in various possible ways, or
not spending it; and so on. As we explained in Part II, cost-benefit
analysts refer to an agency’s options as either “projects” or the “status
quo,” and we will follow that locution here. What must be true of the
project world, for a given person A, such that A is better off there than
in the status quo? Desire-based theories, objective-list theories, and
                                                
62 For overviews of the philosophical literature on well-being, see JAMES
GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING 7-72 (1986); L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS,
AND ETHICS 45-137 (1996). Sometimes the trichotomy of welfare theories is
drawn differently from the way we have just drawn it: as a trichotomy of desire-
based theories, objective-list theories, and mental-state theories, where the last
category in turn is given two subcategories: hedonic theories, and mental state
theories (such as Sidgwick’s) that define welfare in terms of desirable mental states
rather than positive feeling-tones. See SUMNER, supra, at 90-91 (discussing
Sidgwick’s view). Since we are trying to draw a sharp distinction between welfare
theories that rest upon desires, and theories that do not, we include the
Sidgwickian variant within our category of desire-based theories.
63 On the importance of comparisons for justified choice, see generally Ruth
Chang, Comparison and the Justification of Choice, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1998).
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hedonic theories give different answers to this question. A desire-based
theory says that it is a necessary condition for A to be better off with the
project, that A desire the project over the status quo. By contrast, both
objective-list and hedonic theories deny that A’s desiring the project
world is a necessary condition for her comparative benefit. Instead, for
the objective-list theorist, A’s welfare in the project world, as compared
to the status quo world, depends upon the balance of objective goods
that A realizes in the two worlds.64 And for the hedonic theorist, A’s
comparative welfare depends upon the balance of pleasurable mental
states that A realizes in the two worlds.
What is a “desire”? By that term, we simply mean what
philosophers call a “pro-attitude”: that is, some kind of propositional
attitude with a favorable valence.65 “Desires,” thus defined, are a generic
category which include such specific pro-attitudes as wants, hopes,
wishes, favorable judgments, preferences, lusts, likes, and so forth.
What these all have in common is that they take states-of-affairs as
their objects. In this important way, desires are different from non-
propositional mental states such as physical pleasures and pains. I feel
thirsty, or hot, or itchy. I desire that I learn this musical composition,
or that the parade take place, or that we go on a ski trip. Further,
desires are favorable rather than unfavorable. I like learning musical
compositions; I detest reading novels. Both liking and detesting are
propositional attitudes, but only liking is a desire because only liking is
favorable.
                                                
64 What these goods are is a matter for further debate, within the family of
objective-list theories, but standardly they are taken to include such goods as
knowledge, personal relationships, play, the experience of beauty, the
accomplishment of worthy goals, and physical fitness. For some specific lists of
objective values, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85-
90 (1980); GRIFFIN, supra note __, at 67-68; GEORGE SHER, BEYOND
NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 199-201 (1997).
65 On propositional attitudes, see JAEGWON KIM, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 13-14
(1996); on the “valencing” of propositional attitudes, see RICHARD BRANDT, A
THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 24-45 (1998 ed.) By contrast with
Brandt, however, we think that valence need not be defined in terms of choice.
For example, I might retrospectively endorse some state of affairs involving me,
even though I didn’t choose it, and even though I endorse it just because it
happened to me serendipitously rather than through my choice. Cf. SUMNER,
supra note __, at 122-37 (discussing retrospective endorsement).
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We should emphasize that our use of the term desire, here, is
stipulative. The term desire, in ordinary English, has certain
connotations (for example, affective connotations) that we do not
intend. Our definition of desire tracks the broader usage common in
the philosophical literature. Any pro-attitude is, for our purposes, a
desire. And any theory of well-being that makes the satisfaction of
some pro-attitude a necessary condition for A’s welfare is, by our
definition, a “desire-based” theory.
The predominant theory of well-being within welfare economics
is a specific variant of a desire-based theory. This specific variant makes
well-being depend upon preferences, which are one type of pro-
attitude.66 How are preferences different from judgments,
endorsements, wishes, and other pro-attitudes? Although economists
differ over this issue, in the standard textbook treatment of CBA, a
person has a preference for some good if he chooses that good rather
than alternatives. Thus, preferences, unlike certain other pro-attitudes,
are conceptually connected to choice: if I prefer P over S, then I am
necessarily disposed to choose P over S.67 Moreover, preferences, unlike
certain other pro-attitudes, have no necessary emotional or affective
                                                
66 On the nature of preference, see, e.g., SUSAN HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS
55-83 (1989); Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal
Opportunity for Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 158, 161-64 (1990); Arthur
Ripstein, Preference, in VALUE, WELFARE AND MORALITY 93-111 (R.G. Frey
& Christopher Morris eds., 1993). For a full analysis of the related concept of a
“want,” see ROBERT AUDI, ACTION, INTENTION, AND REASON 35-55 (1993).
Critical discussions of the link, within welfare economics, between preference and
well-being are provided by SUMNER, supra note __, at 113-22; DANIEL
HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 71-83 (1996); and Tyler Cowen, The Scope and Limits of Preference
Sovereignty, 9 ECON. & PHIL.253 (1993). We do not necessarily endorse all the
criticisms voiced by these authors, but instead focus specifically on the point that
well-being is not equivalent to the satisfaction of unrestricted preferences. See infra
text accompanying note __.
67 See, e.g., HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note __, at 28 (“We regard Q’s
preference ranking as a subjective state of Q that, along with Q’s beliefs, explains
her choices”). This is not quite the same as saying that Q’s preferences are
“revealed” in her choices, since, for example, Q’s beliefs may be mistaken. See id.
(criticizing revealed preference view). For our purposes, we need not decide
whether the conceptual connection between preference and choice is properly
captured by a “revealed preference” view, or in some other way.
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component: I can prefer P over S without having a strong feeling
about either option. Further, preferences, unlike certain other pro-
attitudes, have no necessary cognitive component: I can prefer P over
S without reason. Finally, and most significant, the standard economic
theory makes well-being depend upon unrestricted preferences. The
theory says that, assuming constant preferences, A is better off with the
project if, all things considered, A prefers the project world (or would
do so given sufficient information).
The standard economic theory is wrong, and we reject it. It is
wrong because A might prefer the project to the status quo for all
manner of reasons, including but not limited to his welfare.68 For
example, A might prefer the project to the status quo because he
believes that the project is morally required, even though A also believes
he would be personally better off with the status quo. Imagine a project
that redistributes resources from the rich, including A, to the needy
poor. To insist that the project here improves A’s own welfare is
confused and mistaken, for several reasons: first, considerations of
morality and welfare notoriously can conflict, and yet the unrestricted
preference-based theory says that necessarily considerations of morality
and welfare do not conflict where A’s preferences track what morality
requires;69 second, what underlies preference-based and more broadly
desire-based theories is the accurate intuition that A is, in some way,
                                                
68 We are hardly the first to articulate the point that the satisfaction of unrestricted
preferences should not be conflated with welfare. Others who have made the same
point include: SUMNER, supra, note __, at 134-35; Allan Gibbard, Interpersonal
Comparisons: Preference, Good and the Intrinsic Reward of a Life, in FOUNDATIONS
OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 165, 173-75 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds.,
1986); John Broome, Choice and Value in Economics, 30 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS
313 (1978) []; Mark Carl Overvold, Self-Interest and the Concept of Self-Sacrifice,
10 CAN. J. PHIL. 105 (1980); Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977);
David Sobel, On the Subjectivity of Welfare, 107 ETHICS 501 (1997).
69 As Overvold puts it: “[S]uppose we accept the prevailing account of self-interest
or personal welfare. Then we will have to say that any act that is voluntary and
informed is thereby in the agent’s self-interest. But self-sacrifice requires that the
act be voluntary, informed, and contrary to the agent’s self-interest. Thus
accepting the prevailing account of self-interest makes the concept of self-sacrifice
incoherent by making it logically impossible that there are every genuine instances
of self-sacrifice.” Mark Carl Overvold, Morality, Self-Interest, and Reasons for
Being Moral, 44 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 493, 499 (1984).
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 40
sovereign with respect to his own well-being, and yet here the welfare
economist insists that A is better off with the project even though A’s
own judgment is that, for himself, the status quo is better.
But there is an important insight underlying the standard
economic theory, and that is, as we have just said, that A is in some
way sovereign with respect to his own well-being. Objective-list and
hedonic theories ignore this crucial point. Both say, in different ways,
that A can be better off in the project world even if his various pro-
attitudes all point in favor of the status quo world. Start with a hedonic
theory. A hedonic theory identifies one or more kinds of
“pleasures”—technically, one or more types of non-propositional
mental states characterized by positive feeling-tones—such that if A
realizes the better mix of pleasures in the project world, he is better off
there. As Charles Sumner explains, in describing hedonism:
There is a core of physical pleasures which are the counterparts
in every respect of physical pains: they have a purely organic
basis, they are often localized in one part of the body, they can
have a quite specific duration, they vary in intensity, and we
employ a similar vocabulary for describing the way they feel.
The paradigm instances are the pleasures caused by stimuli such
as scratching an itch, being massaged, taking a hot bath,
quenching a thirst, using a recreational drug, urinating,
defecating, and sexual arousal and orgasm. What these
sensations have in common, in virtue of which we distinguish
them from physical pain, is just the fact that they feel good.
When asked to characterize the peculiar feeling tone of sensory
pleasure (or pain) we find, like Bentham, that we have little to
say.70
But it is a mistake to think that “pleasure,” without desire—that is,
without a favorable attitude on the part of the person who experiences
the positive feeling tone—suffices to makes that person better off.
Persons can and do judge that pleasure, beyond a certain point, would
be excessive, and purely from the point of view of self-interest. I can
decide that the third glass of wine, or the fourth sweet, or whatever, is
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 SUMNER, supra note __, at 106. See also KIM, supra note __, at 13
(distinguishing between “sensations” and “propositional attitudes”).
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just too much for me; I favor having only two glasses, or three sweets,
and if so I am at least no worse off with that.71
A similar objection can be leveled against objective-list theories.
To see the point clearly, we must distinguish between objective goods
that entail pro-attitudes, and objective goods that do not. “Recreation”
or “play” is an objective value that, presumably, entails a pro-attitude.
I’m not truly playing a game if I’d prefer not to be. A theory of well-
being predicated solely on these kinds of desire-entailing goods is a
desire-based theory, by our scheme. Rather, our objection is to the kind
of theory that is not thus predicated. Take goods such as “knowledge”
or “musical accomplishment.” You can know a lot without wanting,
wishing, hoping, or preferring to know a lot; you can be an
accomplished musician (say, a prodigy forced into music by an
overbearing parent) but prefer, want, wish, judge, and like a life
without music. An objective-list theorist, by our categorization, says
that it is possible for A to be benefitted by the project, even though all
his desires point in favor of the status quo, if, further, he realizes the
right mix of (non-desire-entailing) objective goods in the project
world. This kind of theory, like hedonism, fails to respect A’s own
point of view about what makes him better off. The prodigy who
realizes great musical feats, but truly would prefer watching sit-coms,
is not comparatively better off for his musical accomplishments. The
world may be, but he is not. At best he is neither better off, nor worse
off, as between the accomplishment world and the sit-com world.
In short, the right theory of well-being is (some variant) of a
                                                
71 The sophisticated hedonist might try to solve these counterexamples by
specifying mixes of pleasures so as to take account of considerations of balance,
excessiveness, and so forth: 3 parts gustatory pleasure and 3 parts sexual arousal
are better than 10 parts gustatory pleasure and 2 parts sexual arousal. Yet this more
refined hedonic theory is still open to the objection that it fails to respect A's
point of view. Imagine that A better realizes the specified mix of pleasures in the
project world, but he nonetheless prefers, judges, endorses, and otherwise desires
the status quo. (This is a conceptual possibility because, again, "pleasures" are non-
propositional. For the pleasures that go into a hedonic theory, it is no entailment
of A's experiencing such pleasures that he, further, desire them.) In this sort of
case, we propose, A is not better off with the project. Perhaps he would be better
off if the project also brought with it an adaptive desire, a desire for the project-
induced mix of pleasures; but if it does not, then the project does not improve A's
welfare. At most he is neither comparatively better off, nor comparatively worse
off, as between the project and status quo. See Parfit __.
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restricted desire-based theory. It is a necessary condition, for A to be
benefitted by a project, that he actually desire the project at some point
in time. A further, necessary, condition is that the desire concern A’s
own life: this is what we mean by “restricted.” The mere fact that some
desire of A’s has been satisfied, by the project, is insufficient to ensure
that his welfare is improved, even prima facie B since A might desire
the project on moral, or other disinterested grounds. To be sure, how
to provide a more precise and persuasive account of this “restriction”
remains a large and unsolved problem within the philosophical
literature on well-being.72 (Clearly, to say that A’s desires are properly
“restricted” if they concern A’s own welfare, and that it is both
necessary and sufficient to improve A’s welfare that his thus-restricted
desires be satisfied, would be circular.) We need not and will not
attempt to solve that problem here. Suffice it to say that we find
persuasive the propositions that (a) A cannot be benefited by a project
if he never desires it, or comes to desire it; and (b) simply satisfying any
desire of A’s cannot be enough to benefit him. A “restricted, desire-
based theory” of well-being is simply a theory that takes both
propositions to be true.
It also bears emphasis how large the category of such theories is.
The concept of “desire,” as we mean it here, is generic. A desire is
simply a propositional attitude with a favorable valence. Restricted
desire-based theorists can disagree with each other about what kind of
pro-attitudes (preferences versus judgments versus ex post
endorsements) are relevant. They can disagree about how to handle the
notorious problem of changing desires: Can A be benefitted by the
project if he desires it before it occurs, but not afterwards? If he desires
it at some moments in his life, or only if he desires it at a majority of
moments? Finally, a restricted desire-based theory says that satisfying
a restricted desire is a necessary condition for a project to improve
someone’s well-being. It need not be sufficient. A desire-based theorist
can insist that, for a project to comparatively benefit A relative to the
                                                
72 Mark Overvold has made a sustained attempt to provide a non-circular account
of the restriction. See
Overvold, supra note __; Overvold, supra note __; Mark Carl Overvold, Self-
Interest and Getting What You Want, in THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (Harlan
Miller and William Williams ed. 1982). It is far from clear whether he succeeds.
See Sobel, supra note __, at 795 n.24.
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status quo, A must desire the project (at the right time) and one or
more the following must hold true.
—The Experience Requirement. Gardening is my sole avocation.
I work long and hard to till an exotic garden, designed to foster
exotic and sensitive plants that will take many years to bloom,
if they ever do. I strongly desire that the plants eventually
bloom and endure. Indeed they do, but by that point I have
moved far away, and never learn of the garden’s success. My
desire has been satisfied (without my experiencing that.) Has
my well-being improved? Maybe not.73
—Informed Desires. Looking back over my professional life, I
contemplate an intense and exciting year I spent in a
government-funded research lab. I say to myself, “That year
was fabulous. We solved tough problems; we worked together
as a team; I felt great.” Unbeknownst to me, the results of our
research were funneled to, and instrumental in the success of,
a secret weapons program. Has my well-being been improved
by the research year, notwithstanding my uninformed
approval? Maybe not.74
—The Affect Requirement. I work long and hard to complete a
project. At the end of the project’s completion, I feel
nothing—nothing at all. It’s not that, in general, I lack the
capacity to feel. My affective capacity is of the ordinary type.
Rather, for whatever reason, this particular project leaves me
empty. Has its completion improved my well-being? Maybe
not.75
—Objective Value. I’m obsessed with romance films. I make
sure to see every new release within this category, and spend
                                                
73 See SUMNER, supra note __, at 128 (discussing importance of experience).
74 See Sobel, supra note __, at 792 n.15 (noting that “[a] truly impressive and
diverse list of contemporary ethicists have found [a] full-information [desire-
based] account of well-being congenial” and citing Brandt, Hare, Griffin, Rawls,
Gauthier, Darwall, and Harsanyi).
75 See SUMNER, supra note __, at 138-56 (discussing importance of affect).
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most of my free time watching videos of famous and not-so-
famous romance films from the past. After great effort, I have
succeeded in memorizing the names of the actors and
characters, and the plot names, of every romance film ever
made. And I enjoy all this very much. Would I be even better
off if I had spent all of this avocational energy on high art, or
philosophy, with equal enjoyment? Perhaps so.
Here, too, we intend to remain agnostic about specifics. Whatever the
specific desire-based theory, it will remain true that overall well-being
is both non-empty and morally important, and that CBA is a plausible
decision-procedure by which to implement the criterion of overall well-
being.
B. The Possibility of Interpersonal Welfare Comparisons
A common objection to desire-based theories is that they depend
on the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility while being
inconsistent with any reasonable theory of interpersonal comparisons
of utility. Indeed, as we discussed in Part II, economists developed the
compensation tests because they (i) rejected Bentham’s hedonic
utilitarianism in favor of preference-based utilitarianism, but (ii) did not
believe that interpersonal comparisons of utility were possible or
manageable under a theory of preference-based utilitarianism. Because
we reject the Kaldor-Hicks justification of CBA, while endorsing a
desire-based theory of welfare, we must explain why we do not think
that the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility is
insurmountable.
Part of what animates the traditional view is a general skepticism
about the truth content of moral and evaluative statements. Such
skepticism is, now, a distinctly minority position within analytic
philosophy76 and—more to the point—incompatible with the claim
that, truly, satisfying preferences or desires improves welfare. A second
and more philosophically robust basis for the economist’s traditional
concern about interpersonal comparisons—a concern quite distinct
                                                
76 See STEPHEN DARWALL, ALLAN GIBBARD & PETER RAILTON, Toward Fin
de Siecle Ethics: Some Trends, in MORAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME
PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 3 (1997) (providing overview of contemporary
metaethics).
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from general skepticism about moral or evaluative truth—is the worry
that preferences or desires as such are simply ordinal rankings.77 Where
A ranks the project over the status quo, and B ranks the status quo over
the project, and we know nothing more, we have no basis for saying
that the project improves or degrades overall well-being.
However, desire-based theories of well-being are capable of
incorporating quite a bit more than information about ordinal
rankings. In the interpersonal context, desire-based theories must
incorporate more welfare-relevant information about A and B than the
bare fact of their ordinal rankings. In day-to-day life, we routinely
make judgments of overall well-being, comparing losses to some of our
friends, colleagues, or family members with benefits to others. It is a
condition on the validity of a welfare theory that it warrant some
judgments of this kind. As Daniel Hausman puts it: “[I]f a conception
of well-being does not permit one to make interpersonal comparisons
in an acceptable way, than that conception is itself unacceptable.”78
The fact that a theory of well-being that (a) makes well-being consist
in the satisfaction of bare desires or preferences, and that (b)
incorporates no mechanism for translating the ordinal rankings
constituted by desire or preference into some interpersonally
comparable form, leads to (c) the impossibility of interpersonal
comparisons, does not imply that such comparisons are indeed
impossible. Rather, it implies that the theory is wrong!
So how should comparisons of well-being be made, on a beefed-
up desire-based theory? We are asking, here, not how real-world
agencies should in fact pick out welfare-improving projects, but rather
how the concept of an interpersonal comparison should be
constructed—that is, how an epistemically perfect agency with no
procedural costs would do so. Initially, a project will produce Winners
and Losers. Winners are those who are better off with the project, as
compared to the status quo. Losers are those who are worse off with
                                                
77 See, e.g., Daniel Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons,
104 MIND 475-77 (1995).
78 Id. at 473. For "[i]nterpersonal comparison are an ineliminable part of human
life." Id. at 489. See also John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational
Behavior, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 49 (Amartya & Bernard
Williams eds. 1982) (“In everyday life we make, or at least attempt to make,
interpersonal utility comparisons all the time”).
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the project, as compared to the status quo. A Winner must, at a
minimum, desire the project at some point in his life; a Loser must, at
a minimum, desire the status quo. That is just what a desire-based
theory means. How, more specifically, to classify persons as Winners
and Losers depends on the specifics of the theory and such problems as
desires that change over time.79
In any event, the agency must compare welfare gains to the
Winners with welfare losses to the Losers. The conceptually thorny
problem, of course, is how precisely to do that.80 Broadly speaking,
there seem to be two views within the literature. One view is that the
interpersonal comparison can and should hinge on the degree to which
the Winners’ and Losers’ welfare-constitutive desires are satisfied or
frustrated, independent of the extent to which Winners and Losers
improve or decline with respect to criteria of objective value or hedonic
tone.81 The idea, in economists’ terms, is to cardinalize A’s and B’s
preferences so that A’s gain from the project can be compared with B’s
loss. But how to cardinalize? Perhaps the most famous answer is that
given by Harsanyi, with his construct of extended preferences.
Harsanyi, essentially, proposes this: (1) for every outcome Ok and every
person in the population Ai, permute the persons and outcomes; (2)
imagine yourself to be an impartial spectator, comparing person-state
Ok-Ai with person-state Ol-Aj (that is, “being in state Ok with Ai’s
preferences” as against “being in state Ol with Aj’s preferences”); (3)
from this impartial point of view, create a preference ranking, the so-
called extended-preference ranking, for all person-states, which
(Harsanyi proposes) should be the same for everyone, and which should
                                                
79 More precisely, the agency would need to sort all persons into Winners,
Losers, and Neutrals, where Neutrals are those who are neither better off nor
worse off—which in turn means either that they are precisely as well off in both
world-states, or that they are incomparably well off as between the states. Neutrals
would then be ignored at the second stage of the interpersonal comparison. The
possibility of Neutrals is a technical issue that need not be further discussed here,
because that possibility does not bear on the key problem of interpersonal
comparisons, namely how to compare Winners’ gains to Losers’ losses.
80 See generally Peter J. Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and
How They Are and Should be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF
WELL-BEING 200 (Jon Elster and John Roemer eds. 1991); Hausman, supra note
__.
81 For an overview of such constructs, see Hausman, supra note __.
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respect Ai’s ordinary preferences in comparing two person-states that
both involve her; (4) determine the extended preference ranking for the
Ok lottery (that is, for a 1/n chance of Ok permuted with each of the n
persons in the population) as against the Ol lottery; 5) use this extended
lottery preference as the social welfare function for comparing Ok to
Ol.
82
The Harsanyi construct remains quite controversial. It is unclear
whether that construct truly solves the problem of rendering individual
rankings of outcomes comparable, across persons, independent of an
appeal to the objective value or hedonic tone of the outcomes. Harsanyi
proposes that we each develop impartial or extended preferences over
person-states, and that these extended rankings converge on a single
extended ranking. But why believe that the rankings will
converge—why will we all rank Ok-Ai over Ol-Aj—absent some
independent standard by reference to which person-states can be
ranked? To quote one critic of Harsanyi: “[T]he relevant [extended]
preference must be purged of the judge’s own personal tastes, attitudes,
feelings, moral views and so on. The problem is, then, how, after that
sort of purging [and absent further reference to objective criteria] can
form any sort of preference at all.”83
                                                
82 See Harsanyi, supra note __; see also John A. Weymark, A Reconsideration of the
Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF
WELL-BEING, supra note __, at 255-320; Kenneth Arrow, Extended Sympathy
and the Possibility of Social Choice, 7 PHILOSOPHIA 223 (1978). A less elaborate
construct than Harsanyi's is the so-called "zero-one" rule, first suggested by
Isbell. For each person, construct the familiar intrapersonal cardinal index of
welfare known as the von Neumann-Morgenstern index (that is, the index that
assigns numbers to outcomes such that a person's preferences over these outcomes
are tracked by the index numbers, and a person's preferences over lotteries of the
outcomes are tracked by the expected value of the index numbers for the outcomes).
Make sure, additionally, that for each person the index number 1 is assigned to
her highest outcome, and 0 is assigned to the lowest. Then, Isbell proposes, the
interpersonal comparison of two outcomes, Oi  and Oj , is quite simple: simply
determine the numerical difference between the two outcomes on each person's
zero-one index, and aggregate. This proposal is discussed in Hausman, supra note
__; and Hammond, supra note __, at 215-16. See also Ken Binmore, GAME
THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: PLAYING FAIR 282-96 (1994).
83 James Griffin, Against the Taste Model, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF
WELL-BEING, supra note __, at 53. For a similar criticism, see Hausman, supra
note __, at 477-78. Similarly, Isbell's zero-one rule can been criticized because it
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the controversy
over the Harsanyi construct, and over other attempts to compare the
degree to which outcomes satisfy different persons’ desires, independent
of criteria of objective value or hedonic tone. We need take no position
on the controversy here. For even if it turned out to be true that a
purely desire-based construct for interpersonal comparisons were
impossible, that would not entail the impossibility of interpersonal
comparisons as such. It would simply entail that interpersonal
comparisons do depend, in part, on criteria of objective value or hedonic
tone.
James Griffin is perhaps the leading exponent of this latter view,
within the family of desire-based theorists. As Griffin explains:
[Consider] Mill’s interpersonal comparison of Socrates and the
Fool. The Fool attaches no value to Socrates’ life. Socrates
attaches no value to the Fool’s life. How would each decide
how relatively well off they are? . . . What Socrates [or the
Fool] needs to make is a judgment of a very different sort from
what we ordinarily understand by a personal preference. . . .
Socrates [or the Fool] should need to know, primarily, what
made life valuable. He should have to appeal to his
understanding of what humans, or sometimes humans of a
certain type, are capable of, and of the various peaks that
human life can reach. Then he should have to decide how close
he and the Fool came to some peak. What he should not
particularly need to consult is the phenomenological "feel" of their
experience, nor their personal tastes and attitudes, nor his own
preferences about landing in the one sort of life or the other.84
We emphasize that Griffin is a desire-based theorist, indeed one of the
                                                              
relies upon information about how persons intrapersonally rank outcomes under
risk—each person's index number for Ok, or for Ol , depends upon her
comparative ranking of that outcome, relative to various lotteries of other
outcomes—while what we want to know interpersonally is how the occurrence of
Ok with certainty compares to the occurrence of Ol  with certainty.
84 GRIFFIN, supra note __, at 117 (emphasis added). For a similar construct, albeit
within the context of a more objectivist view of well-being, see Thomas M.
Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL
COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note __, at 39-44.
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leading ones.85 But a desire-based position is consistent with Griffin’s
further claim that it is objective values, and not strength-of-desire, that
furnishes the basis for interpersonal comparison.
To return to our schema of project Winners and Losers: it is a
necessary condition for a person to be a project Winner that, at some
time, she desire the project over the status quo. The basic sorting of
persons into these categories depends, in part, on their desires. This is
where the desire-based theorist and other theorists of well-being
disagree. If you never desire the project, you can’t be a Winner; you’re
a Loser (or a Neutral), and if the last you’re ignored entirely in
aggregating welfare losses and gains.86 But desiring the project is simply
a necessary condition, within a desire-based theory, for a person to be
a Winner; it need not be a sufficient condition, as we have already
discussed in the intrapersonal context. And, relatedly, in the
interpersonal context, the desire-based theorist can say that the
comparative welfare of the Winners and Losers depends upon the
objective values or hedonic tones that they, comparatively, realize.
We are not endorsing Griffin’s view here. Rather, we cite
Griffin’s work to help make evident the point that the following two
propositions are consistent: (1) any reasonable theory of well-being
must make A’s desiring the project a necessary condition for A’s
benefit; and (2) any reasonable theory of well-being must warrant
interpersonal comparisons, i.e., statements to the effect that welfare
gains to the winners outweigh or are outweighed by welfare losses to
the losers. Desire-based theories are reasonable, in both senses. They,
definitionally, satisfy the first proposition. And they can warrant
interpersonal comparisons B perhaps in the manner that Harsanyi
proposes, but at a minimum in the manner that Griffin does.
C. The Moral Relevance of Overall Well-Being
Our defense of cost-benefit analysis rests on the premise that
agencies should, within certain constraints, promote the overall well-
being of citizens. Not everyone, however, agrees that overall well-being
is an appropriate moral criterion.
How can one deny the moral relevance of overall well-being?
First, one can do so by holding the kind of moral view that Shelly
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Kagan aptly calls “minimalist.”87 The “minimalist” believes that persons
have no moral reason whatsoever to make the world better (at least not
a reason of the kind that can ground a moral requirement,88 and that
can thereby warrant government in taxing and coercing persons merely
for the sake of world-improvements). Libertarianism is the most
famous, modern variant of minimalism.89 Libertarianism says that
persons are morally obliged to comply with certain “deontological”
constraints (the constraints against killing, stealing, assaulting,
defrauding, and so on, as exemplified by the prohibitions of the
criminal law), but insists that (a) these constraints cannot be
reinterpreted in the form of “consequentialist,” i.e., world-improving,
requirements; and that (b) persons are under no moral requirement
beyond the requirement of compliance with deontological
constraints.90
Minimalism, of the libertarian variant or any other, is arguably at
odds with commonsense moral views.91 Even more clearly, minimalism
is inconsistent with the scope of modern government. Consider, for
example, an environmental agency. The libertarian holds, in effect,
that the agency can only proscribe those acts endangering the
environment that (assuming mens rea on the polluter) would justify
criminal punishment quite apart from the agency’s regulation. But
surely there are large parts of the clean air, clean water, and endangered
species laws that proscribe actions not independently punishable under
the criminal law—actions that do not, apart from the agency’s
regulation, fall within some traditionally criminal actus reus. Or
consider a food and drug agency. It violates neither the deontological
constraint on fraud, nor any other deontological constraint, to sell to
                                                
87 See SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 1-10 (1989).
88 See id. at 64-70 (distinguishing between moral reasons and moral requirements.)
89 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
90The constraint against killing, as proposed by the libertarian, is not a
consequentialist requirement, because it violates the constraint even if that
violation serves to prevent more killings. For an accessible overview of the
consequentialism/deontology distinction, see SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE
ETHICS 25-105 (1998). For a more technical discussion, see, e.g., David
McNaughton & Piers Rawling, Agent-Relativity and the Doing-Happening
Distinction, 63 PHIL. STUDIES 167 (1991).
91 See KAGAN, supra note __, at 16.
51 Rethinking CBA
consumers a fully and accurately labeled pharmaceutical product,
complete with warnings, that (as it happens) consumers are likely to
misuse. And yet the licensing of drugs for prescription use only is a
central function of the FDA. Finally, consider the antitrust laws. An
agreement among firms to set the price of a product at a particular level
is, for the minimalist, just another free contract. And yet it is a core
tenet of modern antitrust law that price-fixing is illegal.92
What about a non-minimalist critique of CBA? The non-
minimalist critic agrees that consequentialist criteria B criteria that
mark out different ways in which the world goes better or worse B do
bear upon an agency’s choice of projects, but argues that”making the
world better” (Ahaving good consequences”) and “promoting overall
well-being” are wholly distinct.93 Within the modern philosophical
literature, there are two ways that philosophers have drawn this
distinction—two ways in which consequentialism has been severed
from the criterion of overall well-being. The first way is to argue for
some consequentialist standard of distribution other than aggregation,
for example, for equalizing well-being, or for maximizing the well-
being of the person with the lowest welfare. This is a line of argument
that goes back to Rawls, who famously asserts in A Theory of Justice
that social contractors behind the veil of ignorance would choose a
maximin standard for distributing primary goods; and more recently has
been developed by egalitarian theorists such as Dworkin,94 Cohen,95
Temkin96 and Van Parijs.97 We will call this, a bit roughly, the
                                                
92 See Nozick __ (on monopoly). Our argument here is, of course, only the
briefest sketch of the case against minimalism. We will not try to build a fuller
case because minimalism has not figured significantly within the scholarly debate
about CBA; the critics of CBA have, at least implicitly, agreed that
consequentialist criteria of some kind do bear upon agency choices.
93 The distinction between consequentialism and utilitarianism has been drawn
very clearly in the recent philosophical literature. See, e.g., SAMUEL SCHEFFLER,
THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM, 1-40 (rev ed. 1994). The position
that overall well-being lacks even moral relevance, let alone moral decisiveness,
is the limiting point of nonutilitarian consequentialism.
94 See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF.283 (1981).
95 [cite from recent P & PA].
96 See LARRY TEMKIN, INEQUALITY (1993).
97 See PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF ANYTHING)
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egalitarian criticism of overall well-being (and CBA). The second way
to sever consequentialism and “overall well-being” is to bracket the
distributive issue, but argue that well-being as such is morally
unimportant and that some more basic element or prerequisite for life-
prospects, for example, the satisfaction of needs, is what really counts
morally. This second line of argument goes back, again, to
Rawls—with his claim that the principles of justice govern the
distribution of primary goods, that is, resources for welfare, and not
welfare itself—and more recently has been developed in different ways
by Dworkin,98 Scanlon,99 Nagel,100 Cohen101 and Sen.102 We will call
this second line, a bit roughly, the resourcist criticism of overall well-
being (and CBA). For example, Nagel argues:
If you and a stranger have both been injured, you have one dose
of painkiller, and his pain is much more severe than yours, you
should give him the painkiller—not for any complicated
reasons, but simply because of the relative severity of the two
pains, which provides a neutral reason to prefer the relief of the
more severe. The same may be said of other basic elements of
human good and will.
But many values are not like this. Though some human
interests (and not only pleasure and pain) give rise to
impersonal values, I now want to argue that not all of them do.
If I have a bad headache, anyone has a reason to want it to
stop. But if I badly want to climb to the top of Mount
Kilimanjaro, not everyone has a reason to want me to succeed.
I have a reason to try to get to the top, and it may be much
                                                              
CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? (1995).
98 See Dworkin, supra note __.
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100 See Thomas Nagel, Autonomy and Deontology, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND
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stronger than my reason for wanting a headache to go away,
but other people have very little reason, if any, to care whether
I climb the mountain or not.103
Since the climber’s ascent of Kilimanjaro would, in turn, improve the
climber’s well-being—he desires the ascent with sufficient information,
it is objectively good, as a kind of accomplishment, and so on—and
Nagel would seemingly concede as much, what Nagel is claiming here
is that only certain prerequisites or elements of well-being, such as
physical pleasures and pains, constitute a good feature of world-states
that persons in general (and the government) have a reason to
promote.104
How should the welfarist defender of CBA respond to the
egalitarian and the resourcist? Let us start with the egalitarian. The
egalitarian (as we use that description here) claims that the aggregate
amount of well-being, or the aggregate amount of some prerequisite or
element of well-being, e.g., physical pain or pleasure, is morally
irrelevant. She identifies some set of non-aggregative consequentialist
criteria, such that these criteria, along with deontological criteria,
exhaust the moral considerations bearing upon governmental choices.
By “non-aggregative,” we mean that the criteria do not take the
following form: they do not mark out an increase in well-being, or its
prerequisites or elements, as a moral improvement independent of
further conditions, in particular, independent of the level of welfare or
wealth of the persons who gain and lose. Consider, for example, the
following types of egalitarian goals, regularly discussed in the literature:
equalizing welfare, maximizing the welfare of the least-well-off
(maximin), and bringing persons up to a minimum level of welfare. If
a project increases A’s welfare more than it reduces B’s, and does
nothing else, then the equalizer counts the project as morally bad if B
is poorer than A, and as morally good if (roughly) A is poorer than B.
The maximin theorist will count the project a matter of moral
indifference, unless A or B or perhaps both are members of the least-
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well-off group. Finally, the minimum-welfare theorist will count the
project a matter of moral indifference, unless it brings A above the
minimum level or forces B below that level.
Egalitarianism, in the robust sense delineated here, is inconsistent
with the structure and processes of government as we know it. The
welfarist will happily concede that some agencies, such as welfare
agencies, should be solely concerned with implementing criteria of fair
distribution; and that other agencies, such as environmental, or
antitrust, or food-and-drug agencies, might take account of non-
aggregative criteria along with considerations of overall well-being. By
contrast, the egalitarian needs to argue that every agency should pursue
the equalization of welfare, or the maximization of the welfare of the
least-well-off, or some other such non-aggregative goal, as its sole
intrinsic aim. In the case of an environmental agency, for example, this
would mean that the decision to prohibit an environmental pollutant
imposing health risks upon a particular segment of the population,
should depend crucially and solely on the level of welfare (or wealth) of
that segment of the population, as compared to the level of welfare (or
wealth) of the consumers, workers, and shareholders who would bear
the costs of controlling the pollutant. In the case of an antitrust
agency, egalitarianism would mean that the decision to bar price-fixing
in a particular industry (thereby redistributing welfare from the firms’
shareholders to its consumers) should depend crucially and solely on the
level of welfare (or wealth) of the shareholders versus that of the
consumers. Clearly, the decision-procedures that EPA, the FDA, the
FTC, and other ordinary agencies employ, look nothing like this. Such
agencies routinely pursue goals—be these goals such as minimizing
pollution simpliciter, or minimizing pollution in a cost-justified way,
or reducing safety risks to a de minimus level, or minimizing the total
number of deaths, or maximizing economic surplus (the area between
supply and demand curves) in an industry—that have an aggregative
structure.
The egalitarian might respond by saying that ordinary agencies
pursue aggregative goals only in the service of deeper, non-aggregative
ones. Maximizing collective welfare works to the advantage of the
least-well-off, or to persons below a minimum level of welfare, and
conversely is morally justifiable only insofar as it does so. This strikes us
as an implausibly limited account of the moral justification behind
ordinary agencies. Imagine that the shareholders of a firm that emits
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pollution, or sells risky products, are middle class. The pollution, or
products, cause pain and injury to breathers or to consumers who
happen to be even richer than the firm’s shareholders. The pollution
or the product defect can be eliminated at a very small cost to the firm
and, ultimately, the shareholder. Should it be eliminated? The
egalitarian is committed to saying no, unless the pain or injury to the
rich breathers or consumers is sufficiently large to bring their level of
lifetime welfare below that of the shareholders. Or to build upon
Nagel’s example: if you have one dose of a painkiller, which can reduce
some slight discomfort of yours, and the person next to you is suffering
intense, traumatic pain, you should give him the painkiller even if your
future income is $30,000/year and his is $200,000.
In short, aggregative considerations are surely relevant to
judgments of good consequences. Saying that is consistent with the
claim that non-aggregative, specifically egalitarian goals are also
relevant,105 indeed that some non-aggregative goals take lexical priority
over welfarist or resourcist goals. But even if it is true that certain non-
aggregative goals are morally relevant or even take lexical priority over
the welfarist criterion, CBA is plausibly one part of the total decision-
procedure that government properly employs. For example, as between
two projects, neither of which affects the extent of poverty or violates
deontological constraints, “overall well-being” plausibly provides the
decisive moral consideration between them, and if CBA tracks overall
well-being then the agency ought to employ that decision-procedure
in choosing between the two projects.
Now for the debate between resourcist and welfarist. The
resourcist concedes that certain aggregative goals have intrinsic
importance for government. “Agencies do maximize,” the resourcist will
allow. “But what they properly maximize is some element or prerequisite
of well-being, rather than well-being itself.” Agencies maximize the
satisfaction of needs, or (on Nagel’s view) the relief from physical pain;
as between two world-states that equally satisfy egalitarian criteria and
deontological criteria, the resourcist will choose that state where the
aggregate amount of the relevant element or prerequisite is higher. The
difficulty with this view is explaining why, among the elements or
prerequisites of B’s well-being that make a moral claim on A, and that
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justify a governmental project harming A and helping B, only certain
elements or prerequisites of welfare do so. For presumably those
elements and prerequisites derive their moral force on A from the fact
that, in turn, they are elements and prerequisites of B’s welfare. So why
not simply say that B’s welfare makes a moral claim on A? As James
Griffin nicely puts the point:
A group of scholars may, with full understanding, prefer an
extension of their library to exercise equipment for their health.
And part of what makes us think that basic needs, such as
health, are more closely linked to obligation than are desires is
that basic needs seem the “bread” of life and desires mere “jam.”
But an extension to the scholars’ library may not seem like
“jam” to them. On the contrary, if the scholars preference is
sufficiently informed then the library is of greater value to
them. But then to maintain that needs create obligations
where mere desires do not, or that they create stronger
obligations, is to say that we have an obligation, or a stronger
one, to the scholars to give them what they themselves value
less, which would be odd.106
A similar welfarist critique could be made of Nagel’s distinction
between pains and pleasures and “mere” desire-satisfaction. If
producing pain causes you a welfare setback of X, and painlessly
frustrating your desires causes you a welfare setback of X+K, then why
should the first setback make a claim on me, but the second not all?
One possible resourcist response is to advert back to welfare
levels—for example, to define a “need” as any setback to a person that
puts her beneath a certain minimum level of welfare, rather than (as in
Griffin’s example) a health or safety setback to a person, the scholar,
who already is well enough off. “Maximizing the satisfaction of needs”
then means minimizing the extent to which people are below that
basic level. But this strategy turns resourcism into a type of
egalitarianism; it smuggles a non-aggregative structure into the
resourcist goal, through the definition of a “need.” We have already
argued that egalitarianism does not plausibly exhaust the set of goals
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that governmental agencies properly pursue; some of their proper
intrinsic goals are aggregative, and the question here is whether
resourcism can provide a persuasive picture of those goals. We suggest
not. If “maximizing the satisfaction of needs” or “maximizing the relief
from pain” is intrinsically important—important beyond the egalitarian
benefits that happen to flow from agency pursuit of these goals—then
the importance thereof derives from the fact that unsatisfied needs and
unrelieved pains inhibit welfare. But so, too, do (some) unfulfilled
desires.
D. Decision Procedures and Moral Criteria
Having established that the promotion of a desire-based
conception of overall well-being is an appropriate goal of agencies, our
next task is to link this goal with cost-benefit analysis. Our claim is that
CBA is an appropriate means, or decision-procedure, for achieving the
morally desirable goal of promoting overall well-being.
The distinction between a criterion of moral rightness or goodness,
such as the criterion of “overall well-being,” and a decision-procedure
justified in light of that criterion, is an intuitive and (as far as we know)
uncontested distinction. A criterion of moral rightness or goodness
marks out the properties of some action, some state of affairs, or some
other thing that constitute, or partly constitute, the moral status of that
thing. For example, a consequentialist criterion identifies some feature
of a state-of-affairs such that a state-of-affairs possessing that feature,
or possessing it to a greater extent, is better or worse (at least holding
other things equal) than a state-of-affairs lacking that feature, or
possessing it to a lesser extent. “Overall well-being” is, we have argued,
such a criterion. A state-of-affairs with a higher level of aggregate well-
being is, everything else equal, better than a state-of-affairs with a
lower level of aggregate well-being. Derivatively, an action (specifically,
a governmental project) leading to a state-of-affairs with a higher level
of aggregate well-being is, ceteris paribus, better than a action leading
to a state-of-affairs with a lower level of aggregate well-being.
By contrast, a decision-procedure justified for an agent in light of
some (consequentialist) moral criterion is the following: the procedure
for choosing between actions such that the agent’s use of that
procedure leads to the best consequences, as measured by that criterion.
Specifically, the decision-procedure justified for a governmental agency,
in light of the criterion of overall well-being, is the procedure for
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choice between projects such that the agency’s use of that procedure
maximizes overall well-being. Clearly, this concept of the welfare-
justified decision-procedure is distinct from the concept of overall well-
being. Whether a project improves or degrades well-being, relative to
the status quo, is one thing; what steps the agency should take, in
deciding between the project and the status quo, is quite another.
There is no contradiction in saying that (1) the best project for an
agency to choose is the project that maximizes well-being; and (2) the
best way for an agency to decide which project to choose is not to
attempt to identify the project that maximizes overall well-being.107
What drives this conceptual wedge between a criterion of moral
rightness or goodness, specifically the criterion of overall-being, and a
decision-procedure justified in light of that criterion? There are a
number of factors that do so. First is the possibility of epistemic
imperfection on the part of the agent. The agent might make mistakes
in deciding what the criterion requires; and it might further be the case
that some other (morally irrelevant) standard is both reasonably well-
correlated with the criterion, and less subject to mistaken application
by the agent, such that the best decision-procedure for the agent is not
direct implementation, but rather the implementation of the correlated
standard.
Another factor that helps drive the wedge between moral criteria
and decision procedures, is the factor of cost. Assume that the agent is
epistemically perfect. Given sufficient time and effort, she will always
pick out the project that meets the applicable criterion. Even so, the
process of doing so might consume lots of time and effort B resources
that, employed in other ways, might improve the satisfaction of the
criterion even more than their use by the agent for making this choice.
Yet another factor concerns the faithfulness of the agent and,
relatedly, the opacity of the procedure B the ease with which third
parties can verify that the agent has faithfully attempted to follow, or
succeeded in following, the procedure. Assume that the agent is
epistemically perfect and, further, that direct implementation is cheap.
Nonetheless, the agent might be unfaithful. If instructed that she is
under a legal and sanction-backed obligation to directly implement the
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criterion at stake, the agent might aim at other goals (for example, self-
regarding goals) and yet credibly claim (given the opacity of direct
implementation) that she has complied with the instruction. Even if
an alternative decision-procedure is more expensive than direct
implementation, and the agent is less epistemically reliable in following
the alternative procedure, it still might be the case that B given the
transparency of the alternative procedure B instructing the agent to
follow the alternative procedure has better results overall, in terms of
the underlying criterion, than instructing the agent to engage in direct
implementation.
The distinction we are drawing here is familiar to legal scholars.
The distinction is parallel to the distinction, in the legal literature,
between standards and rules. “Standards” are the moral criteria bearing
on some actor’s choice. But the best way to implement a given standard
might be to instruct the actor to apply a rule that tracks the standard
well enough, given the cheapness with which the actor can apply the
rule, the ease with which his compliance can be monitored, and so on.
A “rule” is a simply another term for what we are calling a decision-
procedure: some specification of actions, states and contexts that the
actor should actually follow in making his choice.
The distinction between criteria of moral rightness and goodness,
and morally justified decision-procedures, has important implications
for the legitimacy of CBA. It implies that the legitimacy of CBA is a
moral problem and an institutional one, not a moral problem alone.
Critics of CBA have often assumed that, by undermining the moral
status of CBA B by showing why a positive sum-of-CV’s marks out
nothing of bedrock moral importance about a project, even prima facie
B they have succeeded in making their case against the procedure. Thus
the dominant focus, in the critical literature, on the features of CBA
that no respectable moral criterion would (allegedly) possess: on
Scitovsky reversals; on the sensitivity of CVs to the winner’s or loser’s
endowment; on the moral irrelevance of wealth-maximization per
se.108 But it is a mistake to leap from the existence of these features, to
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the conclusion that it is wrong for CBA to be institutionalized as the
method by which agencies choose between projects. Notwithstanding
the intermittent occurrence of reversals, or of cases where (by virtue of
CBA’s sensitivity to endowments) a welfare-degrading project has a
positive sum-of-CVs, CBA might be sufficiently accurate in tracking
overall well-being and sufficiently cheap and transparent, that it turns
out be the decision-procedure best justified in light of overall well-
being. Or to put the point reciprocally: given the moral criterion of
overall well-being, it is a further and institutional question whether the
welfare-maximizing decision-procedure, for agencies, is: (1) the
procedure of direct implementation (where agencies do indeed attempt
to identify welfare-maximizing projects); (2) CBA, or some refinement
thereof; (3) some nonaggregative procedure, for example looking to
technical feasibility or social norms; (4) some unidimensional,
aggregative procedure, for example so-called “risk-risk” balancing; or (5)
some multi-dimensional, aggregative procedure other than CBA, for
example QUALY-based assessment.
In Section E, below, we will undertake a comparison of these
different types of procedures, and will argue that CBA (or some
refinement thereof) possesses certain advantages, such that it is
plausibly the welfare-maximizing procedure for agencies to employ in
a significant portion of their choice situations. Before we undertake
this comparison, however, it is important to broaden the definition of
CBA. Once we understand that CBA is properly conceptualized as a
decision-procedure, not a basic moral criterion, there is no reason to
insist that CBA is strictly equivalent to the traditional sum-of-
compensating variations test. Rather, we suggest, CBA should be
understood as a family of money-based decision procedures, including
but not limited to the strict sum-of-CVs test. We think it implausible
that CBA, strictly defined, is in fact a welfare-justified decision
procedure. (Among other things, the cost of individualizing CVs
would be overwhelming. In practice, as we noted in the Introduction,
agencies do not actually determine, for each project, what each affected
person’s CV for that project is; rather, agencies use an average value for
the affected population, or rely on statistical techniques to estimate the
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range of variation of CVs across the population.) Our claim is that one
or another refinement to the strict sum-of-CVs test is plausibly welfare
justified for a significant fraction of agency choice situations. And this
claim fits actual practice, given the reliance of agencies upon
refinements, not the strict test. In the remainder of this Section, we
discuss the different ways in which traditional CBA might be refined,
to suit its possible role as a welfarist decision-procedure.
One important kind of refinement concerns the definition of a
CV. Compensating variations (CVs) are traditionally equated with
WTP or WTA. Person A’s CV for a project, it is traditionally
stipulated, is the amount that he would be willing to pay (if a winner)
or willing to accept (if a loser) such that, if paying or paid that amount
in the project world, A would neither prefer the project to the status
quo nor vice versa. But this definition of compensating variation ties
CBA to an incorrect theory of well-being: an unrestricted preference-
based theory. Imagine that A slightly prefers the project, for himself,
but also judges it be to morally wrong and further judges the project
world to be morally worse than the status quo regardless of how much
money he is paid there. (The project, let us imagine, eliminates an
endangered species, or a wilderness area, so as to build a road that will
make A’s daily routine slightly more convenient, but which he finds
morally objectionable because of its environmental impact.) Then A’s
genuine CV for the project would seem to be a positive number, but his
CV, as traditionally defined in terms of WTP/WTA, is negative
infinity!109 Or imagine a case in which A strongly prefers the status quo
for himself, but the project is a paternalist project (for example,
banning narcotics) that is welfare-justified precisely because persons like
A mistake their own well-being. Then A’s CV, as traditionally defined
in terms of WTP/WTA, will be a large negative number B some
narcotics users might demand large payments in the project world
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before they count it as equivalent to the status quo B but A’s genuine
CV would seem to be either zero or a positive number. The narcotics-
eliminating project improves A’s welfare (if he eventually comes to
prefer not using narcotics) or at least does not change it (if his desires
never change); it does not harm A, notwithstanding his mistaken
belief that the status quo is better.
The appropriate redefinition of CBA is straightforward. The
“compensating variation” seeks to capture, in dollar terms, the effect of
the project on each person’s well-being. It seeks to measure, on a dollar
scale, the change in A’s welfare produced by the project. It should thus
be defined, not as A’s willingness to pay or accept, but as her welfare
equivalent. A’s welfare equivalent is the amount of money that, paid to
or from A in the project world, makes her precisely as well off there as
in the project world. While the concept of “willingness to pay” and
“accept” is committed to a particular, and incorrect theory of well-
being, the concept of welfare-equivalent is agnostic across theories of
well-being and would seem to be the right foundation for CBA
whatever the correct theory of well-being turns out to be. We have
argued, specifically, that some variant of a restricted, desire-based theory
is the correct theory. So, for example, a project that satisfies A’s
unrestricted desires, but either (a) does not satisfy or frustrate his
restricted desires, or (b) does so, but does not fulfill further appropriate
conditions (e.g., an experience requirement, or a value requirement)
necessary for a welfare effect upon A, has a welfare equivalent of zero.
More generally (leaving aside, for the moment, certain technical
problems such as the problem of incompensable losses), A’s welfare
equivalent will be positive if the project has a positive welfare effect on
A; negative if the welfare effect is negative; and zero if the welfare
effect is nil. This will be true whatever specific variant of a restricted,
desire-based theory turns out to be correct. (As we have already
explained, we are not committed here to a particular variant.)110
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Now, the defender of willingness-to-pay and -accept has a
sophisticated response to the proposal that CBA should be defined in
terms of welfare equivalents. The response runs as follows: “The right
theory of well-being is complicated and controversial. Although A’s
welfare-equivalent and her WTP/WTA might indeed diverge, we
should not instruct agencies to determine welfare equivalents. Faithful
agencies are likely to make frequent mistakes in determining what A’s
welfare equivalent is, insofar as it diverges from her WTP/WTA; and
the instruction to aggregate welfare-equivalents rather than
WTP/WTA will give unfaithful agencies an increased opportunity for
shirking, given the relative opacity of the concept of >welfare-
equivalent.’ Thus, notwithstanding the failure of an unrestricted
preference-based theory of well-being, the welfare-maximizing
decision procedure for agencies to follow (even on the correct, restricted
theory) turns out to be the procedure of aggregating WTP/WTA, or
some other procedure grounded on WTP/WTA, not a procedure
grounded on welfare equivalents. For WTP/WTA is sufficiently
accurate in tracking welfare equivalents, and is also cheaper to apply,
more transparent, etc.” This sophisticated response is absolutely correct.
Once we reconceptualize CBA as a welfarist decision-procedure, it is
incorrect to assume that the definition of CVs will directly incorporate
the right theory of well-being. CVs might be defined in a different
way (e.g., as WTP/WTA) that tracks the correct theory sufficiently
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well. So both WTP/WTA and welfare-equivalents are possible
variants of the concept of CV; which variant is best, in light of overall
well-being, is an institutional and empirical question that cannot be
determined in advance. On the other hand B and this is our ultimate
point here—the traditional equation of CV with WTP/WTA is too
narrow. CBA might, depending on the facts, need to be (globally or
locally) redefined as the sum of welfare-equivalents rather than the sum
of WTP/WTA. This is one possible, and significant dimension of
refinement of traditional CBA.
A second dimension of possible refinement to CBA concerns the
problem of undefined CVs. This is a large and important issue, one that
the traditional literature on CBA has wholly overlooked, and that we
do not have the space to consider here in detail, but surely bears
mention.111 Economists traditionally assume that compensating
variations are precise and unique. There will be a unique amount of
money that, paid to or from A in the project world, precisely
counterbalances the project’s welfare effect on him; further, larger
amounts will make him strictly better off or worse off, and smaller
amounts strictly worse or better off. Or so it is assumed. But behind the
assumption of precision lies the contestable premise that all world-
states can be ranked as better, worse, or precisely equal with respect to
A’s well-being. This premise is contestable, insofar as some (indeed, an
increasing number of) philosophers, economists, and legal scholars
believe that world-states can be incomparable with respect to well-
being and other moral criteria, i.e., neither better, nor worse, nor
precisely equal.112 (If incomparability can obtain, then there may well
be projects such that, for no dollar payment to or from A along with
the project is A precisely as well off in both worlds, but for some dollar
payment A is incomparably well off. In such a case, there will exist no
precise welfare equivalent, for A, for the project, but only a rough
welfare substitute. ) And even if full welfare-comparability of world
states holds true, it does not follow that A’s welfare equivalent will be
unique. The highly contestable premise behind uniqueness B behind
the assumption that one, and only one, dollar amount counterbalances
the project’s welfare effect on A B is the premise that the correlation
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between dollars and well-being is continuous, monotonically
increasing, and unbounded. Counterexamples to this premise include:
(a) incompensable losses, i.e., welfare differences between the project
and status quo that are too large for any dollar payment in the project
world to repair; (b) lumpy compensation, e.g., for the loss of
nonmarket goods, where a range of dollar payments in the project
world would leave A precisely as well off there as in the status quo
world.
The refinements to CBA, responsive to the problems just
mentioned, are refinements that change in one way or another the
concept of CV, so that A’s “CV” will remain well-defined
notwithstanding incomparability, discontinuity, non-monotonicity,
etc. Rather than being defined as the unique amount of money that
precisely counterbalances A’s welfare loss or gain, the CV might be
redefined, for example, as follows: (a) in the case where A is a loser, the
smallest amount of money sufficient either to compensate precisely A,
or to overcompensate A, or to leave her incomparably well off, or
failing that the lower limit of the amounts that precisely compensate
A, overcompensate A, or leave A incomparably well off; (b) in the case
where A is a winner, the largest amount of money that still leaves A
better off, or precisely as well off, or incomparably well off, or failing
that the upper limit of the dollar amounts that do so. As between
several refinements to CBA, all of which succeed in preserving well-
defined CVs notwithstanding incomparability, etc., the best
refinement is of course the one that, used by agencies, will maximize
welfare.
A third dimension of refinement to CBA, already mentioned,
concerns the degree of individualization of CVs. However CVs are
defined—whether as simple WTP/WTAs, or simple welfare
equivalents, or with some amendment to the basic idea of WTP/WTA
or welfare-equivalent designed to deal with the problem of undefined
CVs B it is implausible that agencies should literally determine, for each
person, what her CV is, and then aggregate. Some method for
approximating the sum-of-CVs (e.g., determining average CV and
then estimating the variation of CV across the population) will surely
be warranted, if CBA is warranted at all.
Finally, CBA might perhaps be refined to correct its endowment-
dependence: to compensate for the declining marginal welfare
productivity of dollars or, equivalently, for the fact that richer persons
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tend to have larger monetary CVs for a given change in interpersonal
welfare than poorer persons. The standard suggestion, here, is to
weight CVs by a factor inversely proportional to the wealth of the
person affected, and then sum weighted CVs.113 Welfare economists
have not yet, in fact, been successful in producing a practicable
weighting factor; but it would be premature to insist that CBA will
never be successfully refined along this dimension.114
* * *
In sum, CBA, traditionally defined as the sum of CVs
(WTP/WTA) should be refined in at least four ways: by redefining
CVs as welfare equivalents; by redefining them to correct for the
possible absence of unique and precise welfare equivalents or
WTP/WTA; by reducing individualization; and by correcting for
endowment-dependence. To be sure, the possibility of such
refinements does not, yet, show that refined CBA is indeed a welfare-
maximizing decision procedure. To do that, we need to compare CBA,
and its refinements, with alternative decision-procedures, including
both direct implementation and others. That is the task to which we
now turn.
E. Evaluating CBA
In this Section, we compare direct implementation of the welfare
criterion with various decision procedures actually employed by, or
proposed for, regulatory agencies: procedures such as CBA (or some
refinement), risk-risk balancing, feasibility-based assessment, norm-
based assessment, and others. We shall distinguish between non-
aggregative and aggregative procedures; in the latter category, between
unidimensional aggregative and multidimensional aggregative
procedures; and, in the last category, between the three leading
candidates, namely CBA (or a refinement), QUALY-based assessment,
                                                
113 See, e.g., Copp, supra note __, at 77-79.
114 If no refinement along this dimension eventuates, the upshot is not that CBA
must be abandoned, but rather that it must be confined to choice situations where
endowment-dependence does not cause too great a degree of inaccuracy B
specifically, situations where the wealth distribution within the group of project
Winners does not differ too much from the distribution within the group of
Losers.
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and the kind of procedure proposed, among others, by Thomas
Scanlon, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Pildes, which we shall call direct
multidimensional assessment.115 Our claims are as follows. First, direct
implementation of the welfare criterion is not a viable decision
procedure; that procedure is hugely expensive and highly opaque and
unreliable, particularly given the amount of individualized welfare
information required by any reasonable construct for making
interpersonal comparisons. Second, multidimensional aggregative
procedures, including CBA, will generally be more accurate than
nonaggregative procedures and unidimensional procedures, although
they will also be more expensive to implement and, to some extent,
more susceptible to agency error and more opaque. If agencies can be
suitably monitored, (some kind of ) multidimensional aggregative
procedure will typically be appropriate for evaluating projects that
appear to have large welfare impacts. Finally, CBA (or some
refinement) offers distinct advantages, relative to QUALY-based
assessment and direct multidimensional assessment, with respect to
accuracy, transparency, or error rate, depending on the choice situation.
Our claims in this Section are couched in vague terms like
“significant,” and are qualified by tempering adjectives such as
“plausibly” and “likely.” Such imprecision and qualification are
inevitable, given the informal and context-independent cast of the
analysis attempted here. The analysis is necessarily informal, given the
large number of specific decision procedures being compared. (A formal
analysis would need to specify which refinement of CBA was being
considered, as against which version of direct multidimensional
assessment, say, and in light of which particular construct for making
interpersonal comparison.) And it seems appropriate to us to undertake
this kind of comparison in an overarching way, without reference to a
particular regulatory context B such as the context of environmental
law, or antitrust law, or workplace risk regulation B given the inchoate
state of the debate about CBA. If a scholarly consensus emerges that
CBA is properly conceptualized as a welfarist decision-procedure, more
specific and formal work will then need to be done. Our goal in this
Article is the logically prior one of showing that CBA is properly thus
                                                
115 More precisely, these are the procedures standardly employed or proposed as
background procedures, for use by agencies when statutory and other legal
requirements become indeterminate.
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conceptualized B which means showing, negatively, that CBA is not
a moral criterion and, affirmatively, that overall well-being is a moral
criterion such that (some refinement of ) CBA is plausibly justified as
a decision-procedure in light of that, in a significant fraction of agency
choice situations.
Why not directly implement the criterion of overall well-being?
By direct implementation, we mean the procedure where an agency
expends resources up to the point of zero marginal epistemic gain (up
to the limits of human knowledge) in order to determine how the
project and the status quo compare with respect to the best construct
for making interpersonal comparisons. That is, the agency is instructed
to make all efforts that will increase its degree of justified belief in the
comparative worth of the project and status quo, with respect to overall
well-being. No proxy is assigned the agency, in lieu of the best
interpersonal construct. And no constraints are placed on the agency’s
gathering of information, other than the epistemic constraint that the
information must have some relevance with respect to that
construct.116 Clearly, direct implementation would be hugely expensive
and highly opaque (at least for agency projects that affect more than a
few individuals), and for these reasons is not a viable welfarist decision-
procedure. This is true whether the best interpersonal construct is a
desire-based construct (such as Harsanyi’s construct), or a construct
based on objective values or hedonic tones (such as that suggested by
James Griffin).
Consider Harsanyi’s proposal, which is the leading candidate for
a desire-based interpersonal construct. (By “desire-based,” here, we
mean a construct that makes the comparison of welfare across persons
depend upon the extent to which winners and losers satisfy their
welfare-constitutive desires, independent of their improvement or
deterioration with respect to criteria of objective value or hedonic tone).
                                                
116 This stipulation is crucial. We are trying to draw a clean line between direct
implementation, and procedures that sacrifice accuracy (more precisely, the
accuracy that would be achieved by a perfectly reliable and faithful agent) for the
sake of cost, transparency, reliability and so on. The cleanest way to do that is to
define “direct implementation” as the procedure where the agent tolerates no
sacrifice in epistemic gain for the sake of cost or other values. The agent takes
whatever steps are warranted, by her lights, to produce the most accurate
measurement of overall well-being.
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In the case of a comparison of a single project O* and the status quo O,
recall that Harsanyi’s proposal amounts to this: (1) for each outcome,
O* and O, and every person in the population Ai, permute the persons
and outcomes; (2) imagine yourself to be an impartial spectator,
comparing person-state Ok-Ai with person-state Ol-Aj (that is, “being
in state Oi with Ai’s preferences” as against “being in state Oj with Aj’s
preferences”); (3) from this impartial point of view, create a preference
ranking, the so-called extended-preference ranking, for all person-
states, which should be the same for everyone, and which should
respect Ai’s ordinary preferences in comparing Ai-O and Ai-O*; (4)
determine the extended preference ranking for the O* lottery (that is,
for a 1/n chance of O* permuted with each of the n persons in the
population) as against the O lottery; 5) use this extended lottery
preference as the basis for comparing O* to O. Directly implementing
the Harsanyi construct would involve a huge amount of individualized
information. For each person Ai, the agency would need to know how
she ranks the project, relative to the status quo. Further, the agency
would need to know everything else about the project’s effect on the
person that would bear upon an impartial ranking of O-Ai as against
O*-Aj, and of O*-Ai as against O-Aj. And quite apart from these
informational demands, Harsanyi’s construct would give agencies
significant scope for shirking and error, since there is often no clear
answer to how impartial spectators would rank person-states
(assuming, as Harsanyi does, that there is at least a right answer to that
question). Not surprisingly, the Harsanyi construct has only been
discussed in the economic and philosophical literature as a plausible
analysis of the concept of “overall well-being.”117 We know of no one
who suggests that regulatory agencies should actually apply it.
Similar difficulties of implementation beset reasonable constructs
for interpersonal comparison that depend, as does James Griffin’s, on
objective or hedonic criteria and ignore “desire-satisfaction” apart from
that. First, any such construct will need to be (at bottom)
multidimensional. There are multiple objective goods that go to human
                                                
117 Discussions in the philosophical literature include: HURLEY, supra note __,
at 103-11;Griffin, supra note __, at 52-56; Hausman, supra note __, at 477-78;
Scanlon, supra note __, at 22-38. Discussions in the economic literature include
Binmore, supra note __.
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welfare, and multiple kinds of pains and pleasures.118 Call each
dimension of objective value or hedonic tone, Di. Second, any such
construct will need to allow that the effect of a project, on a person,
with respect to a particular dimension of value, is individualized. A
beautification project, for example, does not make every person’s life
more beautiful to the same degree; the impact on each person depends
upon her natural appreciation for beauty, her training, her temporal
and spatial proximity to the project, and so on. To put the point
formally: the project’s effect with respect to Di cannot be represented
as Di,project minus Di,status quo  but must instead depend upon the aggregate
of Dk i, project minus D
k
i, status quo, where k represents a particular person and
where these numbers can and do vary between persons. Further, the
tradeoff between the different dimensions of objective value or hedonic
tone will itself be personalized. Imagine a project that increases beauty
in the world for A by 1 unit, but consumes resources that would
otherwise fund 2 units of scientific accomplishment by A. If A is an
artist, the project might still be welfare-improving; if A is a scientist, it
probably will not be.119 Finally, the proper assessment of how each
person fares, both with respect to each Di and all-things-considered,
would be highly indeterminate. Here, as with the Harsanyi exercise of
developing extended preferences over person-states, there would be
ample room for agency mistakes, and for an agency’s pursuit of its own
projects under the cover of making “reasonable” judgments of value or
hedonic tone.
In short, direct implementation is not a live option, for agencies.
That alone is an important result. The standard criticism of CBA, for
its characteristic inaccuracy B for permitting small welfare gains to the
rich to outweigh large welfare gains to the poor B implicitly compares
CBA to the perfectly accurate procedure, namely direct
                                                
118 See sources cited supra note __ (providing and defending lists of objective
values). Cf. SEN, supra note __, at 23-26 (recognizing multidimensional cast of
the assessment of equality); THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 84-98 (1993)
(recognizing multidimensional cast of the assessment of overall human
“perfection”).
119 See GRIFFIN, supra note __, at 58 ( “Nor is there a single right balance [of
objective goods]. The right balance is very likely to vary from person to person.”);
HURKA, supra note __, at 97-98 (same, with respect to account of human
perfection rather than welfare).
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implementation. But the accuracy of that procedure (more precisely, its
accuracy, if perfectly performed) is swamped by the disadvantages just
elaborated. So the proper comparison, at the level of decision
procedures, is between CBA (or some refinement thereof) and other
procedures that are also inaccurate, in various ways, but like CBA (or
some refinement) can economize on decision costs, error rates, and
transparency.
Specifically, CBA and other multidimensional procedures
(QUALY-based assessment and direct multidimensional assessment)
will generally be more accurate in tracking overall well-being than
nonaggregative procedures, and than unidimensional aggregative
procedures. The term “nonaggregative” is a residual, catch-all category.
By this we mean any procedure that does not seek to determine (or to
approximate) the aggregate effect of the project with respect to one or
more (objective or hedonic) constituents of well-being, or prerequisites
for well-being, or proxies for these. Good examples of nonaggregative
procedures actually used by, or proposed for agencies, include the
following: using a de minimus risk threshold for certain types of health,
safety, or environmental risk (that is, banning any product that poses
more than a de minimus risk of the given type, for example, a cancer
risk);120 subjecting proposed regulatory requirements to the constraint
that they be “technologically feasible”;121 permitting or proscribing
harmful activity depending upon whether the activity is “customary.”122
Unidimensional, aggregative procedures pick out one (objective or
hedonic) constituent of well-being, or prerequisite of well-being, or
proxy for these, and enjoin agencies to maximize along this one
dimension. The classic example, here, is so-called Arisk-risk” analysis123:
                                                
120 Cf. LESTER LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION 11-13 (1981)
(describing no-risk approach). Agencies now more commonly employ a de
minimus risk threshold than a true no-risk approach.
121 More precisely, this constraint is not a full decision-procedure itself, but will
lend a nonaggregative element to whatever procedure is employed. On the
feasibility constraint, see id. at 14-15.
122 Most familiarly used by courts in medical malpractice cases.
123 See, e.g., LAVE, supra note __, at 15-17; Cass Sunstein, Health-Health
Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Economic Foundations
of the Current Regulatory Reform Efforts, 10 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 119, 129-31
(1996).
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in effect, “risk-risk” analysis tells the agency to compare the total
number of premature deaths in the project world, with the total
number of premature deaths in the status quo, and pick the world with
the smaller number. The relevant dimension of well-being tracked by
risk-risk analysis is longevity. One could imagine analogous procedures
for any constituent of well-being, or any prerequisite: for example,
maximizing the preservation of the wilderness, or the cleanliness of
water, or the health of the population, or its educational opportunities,
or the quality-adjusted size of the housing stock.
Finally, multidimensional procedures seek to track the aggregate
effect of the project with respect to more than one dimension of well-
being. These are best described by example, since in practice there are
only three: CBA and refinements, direct multidimensional assessment,
and QUALY-based assessment. The idea behind CBA and
refinements is to reduce the project’s overall effect, on each person, to
a single dollar amount (the CV, defined as welfare equivalent or as
WTP/WTA) and then to aggregate. By contrast, direct
multidimensional assessment instructs the analyst to calculate the
aggregate effect of the project along each of several dimensions, and
then to use either predefined quantitative tradeoff rates, or qualitative
judgments, to compare aggregate project gains along the dimensions
where its overall effect is positive, with aggregate project losses along
the dimensions where its overall effect is negative.124 Finally, QUALY-
based assessment, a tool which is widely used by health economists and,
to a lesser extent, by agencies, to evaluate health and risk-related
projects, looks not merely to sheer longevity B by contrast with risk-risk
analysis B but to the quality of the life-years saved (or lost) by
regulatory intervention. Information garnered from questionnaires is
used to discount life years, relative to a baseline of perfect health; for
example, the project of funding a medical program that will enable 100
beneficiaries to live, on average, 10 more years of life, but in a state of
considerable pain, might be assessed as producing not 1000 life-years
but 1000*.8= 800 quality-adjusted life years, with .8 as the discount
factor for that kind of pain.125
                                                
124 See infra text accompanying notes __ (describing different kinds of
multidimensional assessment).
125 See Robert Fabian, The Qualy Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY:
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 118 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994).
73 Rethinking CBA
Why should CBA, QUALY-based assessment, and direct
multidimensional assessment be more accurate than unidimensional
procedures or nonaggregative procedures? Overall welfare, itself, is
multidimensional: this is directly true of an interpersonal construct like
Griffin’s (which incorporates multiple criteria of objective value or
hedonic tone) and, indirectly, true of a desire-based construct like
Harsanyi’s (since persons typically develop preferences over world states,
whether ordinary preferences or “extended preferences,” in virtue, in
part, of the multiple objective values or hedonic tones that they realize
or believe they realize in those states).126 Further, agency projects
typically have multidimensional impacts, not just an impact upon the
one dimension measured by the unidimensional procedure. Consider,
as a paradigm, the dimension of longevity measured by straight “risk-
risk” analysis. Agency projects that increase or decrease the total
number of premature deaths, relative to the status quo, will typically
accomplish more than just that with respect to welfare: they will also
increase the stock or quality of goods, or the convenience of travel, or
air quality, or electricity prices, or whatever. Such effects are completely
missed by risk-risk analysis.127 By contrast, a multidimensional
procedure such as CBA will capture both the effect of the project on
longevity, and its effect on other welfare-relevant dimensions. For
example, a regulation that makes a product marginally safer, but
significantly less enjoyable, or useful, or convenient will have a negative
sum-of-CVs under CBA. This leads us to guess that risk-risk analysis
will generally be less accurate, across the totality of agency choice
situations, than CBA and other multidimensional procedures. At a
minimum, and less ambitiously, we can say this: (1) in choice situations
where the project has a relatively small effect on the dimension of
longevity, such that further this effect is swamped by countervailing
effects on other dimensions, risk-risk analysis will misclassify the
project; (2) such choice situations constitute a significant fraction of
the totality of agency choice situations, since longevity is neither the
sole component of welfare, nor one that takes lexical priority over
                                                
126 See, e.g., Griffin, supra note __.
127 Project gains along even a relatively unimportant dimension of human well-
being, if large enough, can outweigh the welfare cost of premature death. See
Alastair Norcross, Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives, 26 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 135 (1997).
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others. Risk-risk analysis is inconsistent with art museums, public
gardens, national holidays, and many other public projects. In this
sense, risk-risk analysis embodies a significant procedural disadvantage,
with respect to its accuracy in tracking overall welfare; and the same is
true, mutatis mutandis, for other unidimensional procedures.128
As for nonaggregative procedures: these typically capture some
(purportedly) relevant aspect of agency choices other than the effect on
overall well-being. For example, the de minimus risk threshold
employed by some agencies for certain carcinogen risks seeks to prevent
producers from wrongly or unfairly imposing cancer risks on unwitting
consumers or workers; as a matter of overall well-being, however, a few
more premature deaths from cancer might easily be justified by
countervailing benefits, either the forestalling of premature deaths from
other sources, or benefits unrelated to longevity. Similarly, the
requirement that otherwise-justified agency choices be “technologically
feasible” at best reflects a concern for the job security of workers in
regulated industries, such that a technologically infeasible requirement
(which would close down the industry) will not be imposed even if the
benefits to consumers and citizens from doing so would outweigh the
benefits from the industry’s continued existence. As far as we can see,
the only standard nonaggregative procedure plausibly defended on
welfarist grounds is the procedure of looking to social norms B given
the possible efficiency of certain norms. Even here, however, a welfarist
defense would need to be highly qualified and limited in scope. Robert
Ellickson, the leading defender of the view that norms are efficient,
claims that “members of a close-knit group develop and maintain
norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that
members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.”129 Even
if Ellickson’s claim is true (and one of us has argued elsewhere that it
                                                
128 A more sophisticated approach would be to assign different unidimensional
procedures to different agencies or statutory schemes. But multiple dimensions,
other than the dimension tracked by the assigned procedure, might still be
implicated by each agency’s choices. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of
Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469,
473-81 (1985) (describing how statutes standardly authorize or require agencies to
consider multiple values).
129
 ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 167 (1991) (emphasis omitted).
75 Rethinking CBA
may not be),130 a norm-based decision procedure for agencies will have
a haphazard connection to overall welfare where the norm-generating
group is not close knit, where “workaday” matters are not at stake, or
where group outsiders are significantly affected by the agency’s choice.
To be sure, unidimensional and nonaggregative procedures will
typically be cheaper, more transparent, and easier to implement
correctly than CBA and other multidimensional procedures.131 But
error costs and shirking costs can plausibly be held down with
institutional mechanisms, for example the oversight of specialized cost-
benefit bureaus such as OMB or the Congressional Budget Office.132
Assume, at the limit, that the additional decisional costs of the
multidimensional procedure, relative to a unidimensional or
nonaggregative procedure, is purely a matter of direct costs (the costs of
information-gathering and processing by nonshirking, epistemically
reliable agents). Then, for choice situations where the welfare effect of
the project becomes sufficiently large, the multidimensional procedure
will always be welfare-justified (assuming it’s more accurate than the
alternative procedures), notwithstanding its additional decisional costs.
Turn now to a comparison of CBA and other multidimensional
procedures. Consider, first, the procedure we have termed “direct
multidimensional assessment.” This term actually names a family of
related procedures. One variant of direct multidimensional assessment
is fairly quantitative. On this variant, agencies are instructed to calculate
or approximate the aggregate effect of the project along each of several
predefined dimensions D1, D2, . . . Dn, and then to use predefined
tradeoff rates (one for each Di-Dj combination, with i <>j) to compare
aggregate project gains along one dimension with aggregate project
losses along another. This is the kind of procedure suggested by the
remarks of Thomas Scanlon.
                                                
130 Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1697 (1996).
131 Or at least arguably so; it is not clear whether procedures that incorporate the
elastic criteria of “customary practice” and “technological feasibility” really have
these virtues.
132 On the President’s ability to monitor agencies, including through the use of
oversight bureaus, see, e.g., Terry M. Moe & Scott Wilson, Presidents and the
Politics of Structure, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994.
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Supposing, however, that we have formulated a conception of
individual well-being appropriate for the purposes of moral and
political argument, delimiting those personal interests that give
rise to important claims on us and our shared institutions, there
remains the further question of how institutional responses to
these interests are to be measured and how individual
distributive shares are to be compared . . I will refer to such an
answer . . . as an index. An index need not, like Rawls’, consist
simply of exchangeable goods and institutional prerogatives. It
might refer as well to levels of development of personal
capacities, as Sen has suggested, or even to states of
consciousness. The avoidance of chronic physical pain, for
example, might be one component in an index of well-being.
. . .
[A]n index of well-being is something that will be used by
individuals, including legislators and other officials, in assessing
institutional contributions to individual welfare.133
A more qualitative version of direct multidimensional assessment would
define the dimensions along which aggregate project impacts were to
be assessed, but not the tradeoff rates. A yet more qualitative version
would define neither: agencies would simply be instructed to assess (and
report upon) aggregate impacts along “relevant” dimensions, and to use
their judgment in making tradeoffs. Cass Sunstein and Richard Pildes
suggest that agencies might engage in a variant of direct
multidimensional assessment closer to the qualitative end of the
spectrum.
We do not do well if we see such diverse goods as greater
employment, protection of endangered species, lower prices,
distributional effects, and cleaner air along a single [cost-
benefit] metric, one that erases the qualitative differences
among these goods. At least in principle, it would be better to
have a disaggregated system for assessing the qualitatively
different effects of regulatory impositions. . .
                                                
133 Scanlon, supra note __, at 41.
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Through considerations of this sort, we might be able to make
some progress toward reform of existing cost-benefit analyses.
Through regulatory-impact analyses, people should be allowed
to see the diverse effects of regulation for themselves, and to
make judgments based on an understanding of the qualitative
differences.134
Indeed, as we described in the Introduction, direct multidimensional
assessment of the more qualitative kind is a procedure that agencies
regularly employ in lieu of CBA.
Direct multidimensional assessment, of whatever variant, avoids
the endowment-dependence characteristic of CBA. To see the point
most simply: imagine a project that decreases the smog density over one
city by 1 density unit, and increases the concentration of putrid
airborne particles over another city with an identical population by 1
smell unit, such that, further, the interpersonal welfare tradeoff
between a smoggy and a smelly atmosphere is 1 to 1. Then direct
multidimensional assessment will accurately characterize the project as
neither better nor worse than the status quo. If the population of each
city is 1 million, direct multidimensional assessment will count the
project as a decrease of 1 million along the smog dimension, and an
increase of 1 million along the smell dimension, which counterbalance
each other, given the 1-to-1 tradeoff between the dimensions. By
contrast, if the population of the first city is richer than the population
of the second, CBA will, inaccurately, characterize the project as a
welfare improvement.135
On the other hand, direct multidimensional assessment has its
own disadvantages. First, assume that the correct interpersonal
construct (as per Griffin) does indeed look solely to the effect of
projects upon objective dimensions of value or hedonic tone. Even so,
                                                
134 Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 65 (1995).
135 See Copp, supra note __, at 75 (“If Rachel and Paula are equally afflicted with
asthma, then the clean air project might be of equal medical benefit to them, and
this fact could be expressed in terms of the equal breathing efficiency they can
expect if the project is implemented. Yet if Rachel is rich while Paula is poor, she
may be willing to pay more than Paula for this benefit . . . .”).
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the number of such dimensions (if the construct is reasonable) will
need to be large, which in turn tends to make the procedure of direct
multidimensional assessment either less accurate, or less reliable,
transparent, and cheap. To see this point, imagine the regulatory
project of banning the sale of a certain kind of recreational boat, which
poses a low but non-minimal and unavoidable death risk to users. The
quantitative variant of multidimensional assessment might have a
predefined dimension, “Recreational Value,” such that 1-user-hour of
that value is worth some fractional year less of longevity. But surely that
objective assessment is much too crude; it implies, implausibly, that 1-
user-hour with the boat has the very same welfare impact as 1-user-
hour playing chess or 1-user-hour strolling in a public park. So the
predefined dimensions might be made more fine grained. We might
have a dimension for “Boating Recreation” B although even that would
involve inaccuracies B or, finally, “Boating Recreation/Fishing” and
“Boating Recreation/Sailing.” But as the number of predefined
dimensions (and tradeoff rates between them) increase, the decisional
demands on the oversight bureau in maintaining this schema in
accurate shape become large. This problem is avoided by the version of
multidimensional assessment that does not predefine dimensions or
tradeoffs; on the other hand, the absence of predefined dimensions or
tradeoffs makes it much more difficult for the bureau, the legislature,
or the public to monitor agencies.136
The problem with direct multidimensional assessment becomes
deeper if the right construct for interpersonal comparisons is not just
what Griffin proposes B if it does incorporate some information about
the strength of persons’ desires, independent of the satisfaction of
objective-value or hedonic criteria. Imagine that there are two kinds of
                                                
136CBA avoids the problem sketched here because its basic building block is the
individual CV, not units of overall value or hedonic tone. Decisionmakers can
draw a demand curve for the recreational boat market without specifying, or fully
specifying, what it is about the boat that makes it good. If CVs are defined in
terms of WTP/WTA, then the relevant demand curve is simply the observed,
market demand curve. If CVs are defined in terms of welfare equivalents, then
decisionmakers will need to supplement market data B for example, they may need
to provide boat buyers with fuller information, and determine how much money
makes self-regarding buyers indifferent between having and not-having the fully
described boat B but a complete specification of welfare dimensions may still be
unnecessary.
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boats, which are the same in objective and hedonic goodness, and yet
consumers just like the second kind more. There is nothing about the
second boat that justifies the consumers’ stronger preference for it; the
preference just is stronger, and remains so under full information. (Is
this impossible? Think of preferences over flavors of ice cream.) So the
demand curve for the second kind of boat will have a larger area under
it than the demand curve for the first kind. CBA will properly reflect
that difference, while no variant of direct multidimensional assessment
can.
A final problem with direct multidimensional assessment concerns
the individualization of tradeoff rates. Aggregate recreational value, for
the boating market, is being compared with the aggregate increase in
longevity that would result from banning the boat. But, as we
remarked earlier, even on the Griffin-type construct for making
interpersonal comparisons, the true tradeoff rate will vary from person
to person. For A, 1 hour of Recreational Value/Fishing is worth 2
hours less of longevity. For B, 1 hour of Recreational Value/Fishing is
worth 3 hours less. The demand curve or estimated demand curve, in
dollars, for the boat will reflect the mix of recreation/longevity tradeoff
rates among the population of consumers. By contrast (at least where
predefined nationwide or regional tradeoffs rates are specified, which
would presumably be the case with the quantitative variant of direct
multidimensional assessment), this welfare-relevant information about
the boating market would be lost.
What about QUALY-based assessment? Sunstein and Pildes
identify this procedure as another possible alternative to conventional
CBA.137 But note that QUALY-based assessment is standardly used,
and conceptualized, as a cost-effectiveness tool for evaluating health and
risk regulation and expenditure.138 That is: given a fixed dollar budget
(which could be a budget for direct governmental expenditures, or a
“regulatory budget” for compliance costs) the agency chooses the policy
that maximizes QUALYs. Another way to put the point is that
QUALY-based assessment has limited scope: the project, the status
quo, and all other options being compared must be identical except on
the dimension of health and risk. Imagine that the status quo involves
                                                
137 See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note __, at 83-85.
138 See Fabian, supra note __. See generally LAVE, supra note __, at 19-23
(discussing cost-effectiveness analysis).
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a baseline governmental expenditure of $100 million for a saving of 200
quality-adjusted-life-years, and the project involves a governmental
expenditure of a different amount, say $500 million, for a saving of
1100 quality-adjusted-life-years. Standard QUALY analysis has
nothing to say about this comparison.
In theory, the standard QUALY procedure could be
reconceptualized as a general multidimensional tool: one would simply
calculate the total number of quality-adjusted-life-years in both the
project world and the status quo year, with quality adjustments not just
for health effects but for any kind of effect on welfare.139 The problem,
here, is translating non-health effects into quality discounts or
premiums. By what factor does the eating of an ice cream cone, once,
change the quality of the year in which it is consumed? By what factor
does the experience of walking in an old-growth forest? A faster daily
commute home? Better visibility over your home? To be sure, CBA
also involves quantifying these welfare effects, but we see a number of
obvious reasons why the translation of ice cream cones, wilderness
walks, faster commutes, and so on into dollar CVs would could be
performed more accurately, cheaply, and transparently, by agencies,
than their translation into discounts or premiums for life-years. First,
many goods, or their welfare analogues, are traded on markets; and the
market price of a good is at least some evidence, perhaps strong
evidence, of its CV for a given person, depending on how the concept
of CV is defined. Second, the very fact that a person routinely trades on
markets will make it easier for her to conceptualize welfare impacts in
dollar terms; however difficult the respondent to a CV-survey140 might
find it to value ice cream cones, wilderness walks, etc., in dollar terms,
we would expect that the respondent to a QUALY-survey would find
                                                
139 For example, if the $400 million difference in the above hypothetical would be
spent on a 1-year arts program in the status quo, such that each of 100,000 viewers
would experience a .005 increase in the quality of her year, the $400 million
difference could be translated into an increment of 500 quality-adjusted-life years
for the status quo, relative to the project. Alternately, as some suggest, see Fabian,
supra note __,, a standard-quality year could be monetized, along with other non-
health benefits; but this is just then a kind of CBA.
140 On the use of so-called “contingent-valuation” surveys to determine CVs, see
MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note __; CONTINGENT VALUATION: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993); Symposium, Contingent
Valuation, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 3.
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the valuation yet more difficult, and the answers to QUALY-surveys
(for these non-health effects) yet less reliable.141
* * *
The comparison between CBA and other multidimensional
procedures is a complex one. We have no doubt that, for some choice
situations (for example, for a choice between two large health-related
policies that have identical non-health impacts), either QUALY-based
assessment or direct multidimensional assessment will turn out to be
the welfare-maximizing procedure. But the case for a wholesale
replacement of CBA has not been made and, we think, cannot be. Our
analysis suggests that QUALY based assessment is best limited to use
as a cost-effectiveness tool, and that agencies are welfare-justified in
engaging in direct multidimensional assessment in lieu of CBA only
where wealth effects are likely to be large (for example, where the
winners or losers are significantly richer or poorer than the losers or
winners). CBA has flaws, but so do its alternatives B including flaws
with respect to accuracy in tracking overall well-being, something that
has been a standard complaint about CBA.142
F. Non-welfarist considerations
Sometimes it is objected that CBA fails to reflect nonwelfarist
considerations, for example, considerations of fair distribution;143 and
sometimes it is said, in response to this objection, that to talk of fairness
                                                
141 Finally, and on a different note, it should be observed that QUALY-based
assessment is not a perfect welfarist procedure, quite apart from these issues of
transparency, reliability, and decisional cost. The addition of one standard-quality
year to the life of a long-lived person arguably has less impact on overall well-
being than the addition of a standard-quality year to the life of someone with fewer
total years to her life. Longevity (quality adjusted or not) has declining marginal
utility, just like wealth; and thus QUALY-based assessment has its own analogue
to the problem of endowment-dependence that afflicts CBA.
142 Our defense of CBA is not meant to be a criticism of market-based
alternatives, where those are appropriate. The great advantage of the latter is that
they do not put great strain on the ability of agencies to gather and evaluate
information. CBA is not a rejection of command-and-control regulation and not
a solution to all its problems. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social
Justice 375-76 (1997).
143 See, e.g., Lester B. Lave, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed the Costs?,
in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 104, 114-15 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).
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is simply to express a preference, and that the preference for fairness
(like any other) would indeed figure in a proper accounting of costs and
benefits.144 In our view, both the objection and the response are
misconceived.
Start with the response. The response is misconceived on two
counts. First, it embodies a metaethical confusion, about the nature of
moral facts. It is a moral fact that, everything else equal, government
projects that promote overall well-being are better than government
projects that do not. It is also a moral fact that government should not
deliberately murder an identified, innocent person, even if doing so
increases overall well-being. This latter, moral fact does not reduce to
preferences; even if virtually everyone preferred to murder the one
innocent, doing so would still be wrong. Nor does the former moral
fact: even if virtually everyone preferred, say, projects that benefitted an
elite which had succeeded in brainwashing the population to believe
the elites to be morally superior, it would still remain a moral fact that,
as between a project P1 that improves overall well-being and a project
P2 that benefits the elite, P1 is morally better. The metaethical notion
that a moral fact reduces to a fact about what everyone, or the majority
prefers, is an implausible version of conventionalism about ethics.145
Second, the response conflates preference and well-being.
Satisfying certain preferences is important, but this is not a
foundational matter; it is not because, at bottom, moral claims are
claims about preferences. Rather, it is true within ethics because,
among other things, overall well-being is morally important, and
certain preferences are constitutive of well-being. Which ones? That
depends, as we have already explained, on your theory of well-being.
The right theory is a desire-based theory; and, if “preference” is taken
broadly to mean desire, i.e., a pro-attitude, then people are indeed better
                                                
144 See generally Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare
Economics in Normative Analysis of the Law (unpublished manuscript 1998).
Although Kaplow and Shavell’s views fall into this general category, their
argument is complex and the reader should make no inferences about it from our
discussion in the text.
145 On ethical conventionalism, see, e.g., BRINK, supra note __, at 14-36. At best,
moral facts reduce to facts about ideally informed preferences, which are still
different from facts about what the majority or all of us actually prefer. For an
argument that moral facts do reduce to facts about ideally informed preferences, see
MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM (1994).
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off to the extent that certain of their preferences are satisfied. The
word “certain” deserves emphasis, here, because desire-based theories
might require restricted desires, or informed desires, or even good
desires. If a project will alleviate the misery of the rural poor, then the
misanthrope who has the sadistic preference to see the rural poor suffer
is arguably not better off if in fact they do suffer. Sadistic preferences
might not be—indeed, plausibly are not—constitutive of well-being.146
Similarly, if a project will alleviate the misery of the rural poor, and a
concerned taxpayer (a) concludes that distributive justice requires
helping them, and therefore (b) prefers a rural-poverty project, then
this fairness-preference might not be—indeed, plausibly is
not—constitutive of the taxpayer’s well-being.147 Do we want to say
that the rural project is supported both by considerations of fair
distribution and, in addition, by the taxpayer’s well-being? That seems
implausible. We do not believe that the fairness of a project increases
its CV, insofar as persons prefer the project just because they judge it to
be fair. An economist who disagrees will need to argue, more
specifically than economists have done, about the nature of well-being;
he will need to show why preferences for fairness are constitutive of
well-being, just like preferences for concerts, widgets, and skiing. And
even if he shows this, he will need to admit that the moral force of
fairness is not exhausted by preference: a project might be, all things
considered, morally wrong (say, distributively unjust) even though it
does improve overall well-being.
So our welfarist defense of CBA is nested within a view of
morality that is cognitivist148 (not skeptical) at the metaethical level,
and non-utilitarian at the substantive level. Again: overall well-being
is morally relevant, not morally decisive. To claim moral decisiveness is
to affirm utilitarianism, which famously leads to a variety of
counterintuitive moral positions, for example, that killing one to save
two is morally required, or that persons are obliged to abandon their
personal pursuits if doing so would increase overall well-being.149 The
                                                
146 See, e.g., Harsanyi, supra note __, at 56.
147 See supra text accompanying note __ (arguing for a restricted-desire account of
welfare).
148 On cogntivism, see Darwall, Gibbard & Railton, supra note __.
149 See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR
AND AGAINST 77 (1963).
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non-welfarist considerations that bear upon the worth of
governmental projects may include some or all of the following: (1)
deontological considerations, specifically, constraints against
performing projects that maximize good consequences;150 (2)
egalitarian or “distributive” considerations, such as the effect of the
project on the welfare of the least-well-off group, or on persons below
the poverty line, or its effect on the equality of welfare or resources;151
(3) desert-based considerations, namely, the extent to which the project
rewards the deserving and harms the culpable;152 (4) perfectionist
considerations, such as the purported intrinsic good of preserving
endangered species or ecosystems or, more generally, good
consequences produced by the project quite apart from any effect on
welfare.153 We do not mean to commit ourselves to a particular view
about the nonwelfarist component of morality; we simply mention
these four as standardly-discussed possibilities.154
CBA does not plausibly capture, and is not meant to capture, non-
welfarist considerations. The objection that CBA fails to capture them
is really no objection at all B any more than, say, the failure of a
statistical measure of equality to track overall well-being (rather than
equality) is an objection to the proposition that agencies should use that
measure in assessing the distributional consequences of its projects. We
do not conceptualize CBA as the exclusive choice procedure for
government, but as one part of the overall set of procedures and
institutions by which projects are ultimately approved, rejected, or
amended. How nonwelfarist considerations should be captured B
whether agencies should generally use CBA and non-welfarist
procedures seriatim; or instead there should be a separation of welfarist
and non-welfarist considerations between agencies; or instead non-
                                                
150 See supra text accompanying note __..
151 See supra text accompanying note __.
152 See GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987).
153 See HURKA, supra note __; HOLMES ROLSTON, III, ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN THE NATURAL WORLD 126-59 (1988).
154 A further point is that if people’s moral preferences are sufficiently widespread
and uniform, then a project of maximizing social welfare reduces to a project of
respecting people’s moral views. Cost-benefit analysis, or a procedure of
maximizing social welfare, would be methodologically empty because parasitic on
the philosophical project of ascertaining people’s morality.
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welfarist considerations should uniquely be the concern of the
legislature, the court system, or both B is too complex an issue to be
considered here.
CONCLUSION
CBA is a useful decision procedure and it should be routinely used
by agencies. CBA appears to be superior to rival methodologies in
enabling agencies to evaluate projects according to the extent that they
contribute to overall well-being. It allows agencies to take into account
all relevant influences on overall well-being, unlike simpler decision
procedures like risk-risk; and it enables agencies to weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of projects in a clear and systematic way,
unlike more complex decision procedures. Because maximizing overall
well-being is an important role of the government in all major political
theories, and is consistent with widespread intuitions, it is a worthy
goal of agency action. Finally, CBA plays the important political role
of increasing regulatory transparency. The political branches can
monitor agencies more easily when the agencies monetize the
advantages and disadvantages of projects than when agencies use
qualitative decision procedures.
However, CBA serves these useful purposes only under certain
conditions, and agencies should take account of these conditions when
evaluating projects. First, CBA must give way to important non-
welfarist concerns, such as deontological rights. An agency should not
approve a project that has a positive sum of CVs if it involves the
unjustified sacrifice of an innocent. Second, CBA must give way when
the endowments of affected people vary a great deal. Either the agency
should attempt to adjust CVs in light of wealth differences, or it should
abandon CBA in these circumstances in favor of a more complex
decision procedure, or perhaps it should encourage the political
branches to construct a deal that compensates the losers. Third, CBA
must be adjusted to account for uninformed or distorted preferences.
Agencies may be able to overcome these problems by informing
individuals before determining individuals’ CVs, or even by engaging
in an imaginative reconstruction of their preferences. But in all these
cases, the extent to which the agency should defer to people’s stated
preferences or not must depend on its competence, the importance of
transparency, the effectiveness of political monitors, and so on.
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Interestingly, agencies already seem to depart from textbook CBA
in order to respond to these concerns. As the pesticide case study
shows, agencies are sensitive to wealth differentials. EPA did not
assume lower CVs for risk of death for migrant farm workers than for
the average person. As the Grand Canyon case study shows, agencies
are sensitive to information problems. However crude the technique
may have seemed, the agency clearly understood that informed
preferences were more relevant than uninformed preferences. As the
lead-in-drinking-water case study shows, difficulties in monetizing
benefits can be overcome. Of course, the departures from standard
CBA methods create some uncertainty, and this uncertainty makes it
more difficult to evaluate agency decisions. Nevertheless, compromise
of some sort is sensible and unavoidable, and EPA’s behavior shows
that while CBA methods cannot be applied mechanically, agencies can
use it to guide judgment, in a way that rationalizes and clarifies agency
action.
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